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حَتّىٰ لا تَكونَ فِتنَةٌ

"MAN'S UNRULINESS AND GOD'S RULE."

The pitfalls of translation are notorious but the worst of them have nothing to do with grammar. They belong rather to a certain double-significance of which some pivotal words are capable. Outstanding among Quranic examples is the crucial word 'Fitnah' which, with verbal derivatives from the same root, occurs some forty odd times in thirty one different Surahs. The dictionary will enlighten you with a host of obviously connected meanings — trial, test, allurement, discord, persecution, impiety, madness, sedition, riot, disturbance. In some settings there is no problem as to how it should be rendered. When Surah viii.28 and Surah lxiv.15, for example, warn the Muslim believers that their children and worldly possessions will be a 'Fitnah' to them, it evidently means that they may be deterred or allured from the duties and dangers of battle by the sense of their progeny and their goods, alike dependent and desirable.

But that form of trial is hardly meant when in Surah iii.7 it is alleged that unbelieving detractors seek to interpret Quranic allegory in their own mischievous sense, thereby arousing confusion ('Fitnah') or dissension in the ranks of the faithful. Surah lx.5 likewise records the prayer of the Muslims that God would not expose them to the machinations of the unbelievers where the meaning almost seems to be that the latter make the faithful a prey of their conspiracy. There is little in common, save the fact of a testing, in the mute appeal of youngsters that their parents stay at home from battle and the calculated and evil designs of cunning enemies.

Thus far, however, the diversities of 'Fitnah' could well be contextually settled. The problem deepens in the crucial passage which aroused these meditations, where Islam is directed to make war or sustain resistance until there be no more 'Fitnah.' (Surah viii.39). Some translators here take the word to mean 'idolatry' so that the whole directive reads: "Fight them until idolatry is no more and God's religion is supreme." This may well be the final sense but there can be little doubt that it is more interpretative than exact. More strictly 'Fitnah' is what a militant polytheism does, or did, in the Meccan and Medinan situation against the preaching and policy of the Prophet. An idolatry not violently or subtly resistant to Muḥammad there would be no justification in equating with 'Fitnah'. The emphasis of the word is undoubtedly on the counter-action of the opponents of Islam. 'Fitnah' is not just difference of view or contrariety of doctrine: it is such divergence sharpened into hostility and antagonism, so that these in turn constitute a menace or a test for the original disciples.

Now it is equally possible to render the term either by 'persecution' or 'sedition'. From one angle there is little to choose between them, since persecution is what a majority does against a minority while sedition is what a minority does within a majority. The only difference is that the roles are reversed. When persecution becomes sedition you are still being opposed and countered but you have become dominant in the meantime. Only states suffer sedition: one cannot reasonably speak of persecuted power. From another angle, however, there is a world of difference between these two interpretations since there is a profound religious contrast between fidelity under persecution and action against sedition. Persecution in the end cannot happen to states: sedition cannot occur outside them.

It is in something of these terms that the word 'Fitnah' in the Qurʾān, when it relates to communal antagonism to Islam and not to temptation within the Muslim household,

epitomises the deep underlying issue about the concept of religion in life within Islam and raises a far-reaching theological study where Muslim and Christian may well meet, think, wonder and ponder, in the fullest mutual openness of spirit. To fight until sedition be no more is a proper, indeed an inescapable, civil and political obligation. "To stand" (rather than, in the aggressive sense, to fight) until persecution tires is a proper religious vocation. If we may judge from the first article in this quarter's issue there is a widely held Muslim belief that there is no difference, and certainly no quarrel, between these two. What is proper for states is proper for faiths. The latter should aim to surmount persecution by becoming the former: then, if the antagonism persists in the form of sedition, they go on, properly, to liquidate it.

Such would seem to be, generally understood, the pattern of Islamic origins. It would seem right and inevitable to gauge the meaning of 'Fitnah' (when the choice is between sedition and persecution) by the stage that has been reached in the history of Islam within the Quranic development. In the Gospels and the rest of the New Testament, we find an initial similarity and a growing irreducible contrast, both of which it may be well for us all to try to explore, not for communal debate but for common search into a vast problem that is ever with us. How does, how should, the truth prevail? What is the religious criterion of religious history? The question is vital to us both. For by definition, Islam has to do with man's surrender to God, the terms and sanctions of which are, therefore, crucial: while Christianity has at its heart the pattern of Christ's Cross.

There was 'Fitnah' enough on Good Friday. Discordant clamours for blood; ugly conspiracy; trial by slander and obloquy; the temptation to abdicate from love; and riot, foul and unrestrained. Here, indeed, was testing that became a test-case. And there was no capitulation: only love standing in the obligations of fidelity to its own discerning of its costly pathway. Out of the stuff of this victory of meekness, this

strength of sacrifice, the Christian faith was kindled and released. Until its own self-betrayal, the story of the Church was the triumph of the persecuted. Nowhere is this more clear and moving than in the story of Saul of Tarsus, on his way to Damascus. " I am Jesus Whom thou persecutest" was the answer of the voice from heaven when he sought to know by whom he had been thus, in full career, arrested. It was another and dramatic occasion of the significance of the Cross, of the revolutionising power of the persecuted over the persecutor, in which the victory is won, not by inflicting defeat but by transforming it.

How tremendous is this Quranic objective that there may be no more obduracy, no more disobedience, no more spiritual resistance, but that men and religion may be wholly God's. (Surah viii.39) Surely the Christian must yearn for the recognition of the central place of the Cross in this objective. For in the end, as the Qur'ān so well knows and as no Muslim can escape seeing as long as he is serious about *islām,* there is no religiously worthy relationship with God that is compelled. That is why unbelief can never be finally dealt with in terms of sedition, why statehood (though it may have its place in the protection and discipline of man in his nature) can never be the sacrament of the Kingdom of Heaven. For either our *islām* to God is a compelled surrender — in which case it is unworthy of Him and irreligious, or it is uncompelled and loving — in which case Omnipotence will be related to it in appropriate readiness to wait, to seek and so to suffer. As Willam Temple so finely said: "If God exercised compulsion by forcing obedience or by remaking the character of a self against its will, He would have abandoned omnipotence in the act which should assert it, for the will that was overridden would remain outside His control." The only conquests of truth that are true are those that are free. The will that learns to will God's will only learns so on the condition of love, and only when it does is "religion wholly God's."

Man's 'Fitnah' is the fruit and measure of his self-idolatry,

the outworking of his chronic pride, his capacity for the rejection of truth and defiance of God. The urge to repress it with patterns of authority familiar to this world and, in their place, valid and of God, may seem entirely proper to assured custodians of revelation. But if we identify it, in all its depth and range, with sedition to a particular authority and its correction to the triumph of that order, shall we have taken its full measure or saved its real lostness? Shall we have redeemed that order itself, sedition against which has become for us the nature of evil? Or, on the other hand, is the pattern of the Cross too radical and far-reaching an enterprise to be undertaken by the rule of God about the unruliness of men?

The world of our generation is full of the instinct to identify both wrongness and its correction as political. "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you" appears, in a phrase coined by Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, to be its watchword. In that sense, perhaps, modern man is instinctively 'Islamic.' He believes, that is, that statehood is his salvation. The fact is plain in Israel, in Pakistan, in nascent Africa and Asia.

As a negative corrective against exploitation and the indignity of alien rule, this outlook is right and inevitable. But is there not sharp danger in asserting, with Dr. Nkrumah in the Introduction to his *Autobiography,* that "it is impossible to talk of the equality of races in any other terms" than the political and that, therefore, "the whole solution of the problem" lies in political freedom? (p. ix.) For unless there is a spiritual equality, political revolution has no sanction save success and no criterion save material odds.

By all means let it be confessed that there are urgent political elements in man's being right and God's being Lord (these two, in the end, being one.) But the 'Fitnah' which damns society and defies God cannot be brought under the one form of sovereignty that answers it, namely God's, save in terms of repentance, love and the Cross. Nowhere in history is this inescapable truth clearer than when Jesus rode into Jerusalem and was crowned with thorns.

MAULĀNĀ MAUDŪDĪ ON QURANIC INTERPRETATION

Maulānā Abū-l-ᶜAlā Maudūdī has been active in Islamic affairs on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent for over a quarter of a century. His extensive writings during that time have been marked by a graceful, appealing style. He has translated the Qurᵓān, with commentary, into Urdu; his monthly journal, *Tarjuman-al-Qurᵓān* (Interpreter of the Qurᵓān), founded in 1932 at Hyderabad-Deccan and now published in Lahore, is one of the best edited Urdu magazines in Pakistan; in addition, he is the author of many books and pamphlets on the subject of Islam and the modern world. As leader of the political party *Jamāᶜat-i-Islāmī* (Community of Islam), the Maulānā has definitely cast himself in the role of an opposition to the present government in Pakistan, maintaining that it is both too western in thought and too secular in outlook. Both he and his party, naturally enough, are looked upon with suspicion by the Pakistan government.

Maulana Maudūdī represents the view of those students of Islam who, while recognizing that the modern world is very much with us, want to have it lived according to Islamic principles. This involves the development of a rather extensive systematization of those principles, based upon the Qurᵓān, the Ḥadīth, and the lives and examples of the Prophet and his Companions. In a sense, this is the most conservative way to apply the teaching of Islam to present-day problems, involving the least amount of change and seemingly always remaining closest to the original sources. This method is not, however, without its own innovations. It requires the establishment of a *system* which in itself may be new. Indeed, this is the crux of the complaint of those critics of Maudūdī who complain that he has taken the spirit out of Islam, and left nothing but the bones. Nevertheless, his position involves a little of the modernist—he has conscientiously tried to apply Islamic principles to all of the modern world as he understands it—and much of the traditionalist. From a theological standpoint, he is more in accord with the teachings of Deoband than with those of any other Muslim theological school on the subcontinent, although he, himself, never formally attended any theological school.

It is difficult to estimate the influence of Maudūdī, or of his *Jamaᶜat-i-Islāmī*. Certainly many people in Pakistan consider him a leading Islamic scholar. His reputation in this respect extends beyond the borders of that country. Within Pakistan, he has an appeal among those mullahs who are neither ultra-reactionary nor tinged with westernism. Politically, however, his party has never demonstrated much strength. It has lacked the funds to wage much of a campaign, and has had continually to fight against government candidates. The role of the *Jamaᶜat* against the Aḥmadiyyah during the 1953 riots in the Punjab apparently weakened the party, although this may be true

only superficially. At any rate, the extensive social welfare work carried on by the *Jama'at*—the maintenance of dispensaries for the sick (both mobile and stationary), the provision of free medicines, the distribution of relief to flood and other victims—indicates that it is a positive, earnest organization, that should not be lightly discounted. Its efficient publicity organization ensures that the views of its leader receive a wide dissemination. His writings have, in fact, been translated into English, Arabic, Indonesian, and almost all the major languages of India.

Inasmuch as any changes in Islam are dependent in large part upon Quranic interpretation, a knowledge of the position of such thinkers as Maudūdī should be of special interest. The writer addressed to him a series of questions in June 1955, and received an extensive, detailed reply in December. The questions, and the reply so kindly made to them, with only minor changes, are reproduced below. They have, incidentally, previously appeared in Urdu in *Tarjuman-al-Qur'ān*.

QUESTIONS ON QURANIC INTERPRETATION

A most perplexing problem in trying to understand Islam is that of the interpretation of the Qur'ān. The following questions are designed to clarify confusion in this matter. They center around a specific problem, in order to elucidate the principles of interpretation as they apply to particular problems.

According to the Surah ii.256, "There is no compulsion in religion."

1. Is the Iranian persecution of the Bahais at variance with this verse? If not, why not? Were the anti-Qadiani disturbances [the riots against the Aḥmadiyyah, 1953] at variance with this verse? If not, why not?
2. What does *compulsion* mean? Is it more inclusive than *coercion*? Are tax benefits, or citizenship benefits, for Muslims a form of compulsion in the modern state? Certainly a marginal business man might be compelled to become a Muslim to maintain his livelihood.
3. Does the word religion here (*din*) have a more limited significance than it usually possesses?
4. One commentator on this verse [Muḥammad 'Alī, of the Lahore group of the Aḥmadiyyah] says: "Muslims are told that when they hold the power in their hand their guiding principle should be that there should be no compulsion in religion." How does this commentator read the application of this verse only when Muslims "hold the power in their hand"? Do you agree with this interpretation?
5. If you do agree, does it follow that compulsion can be used until a position of power is achieved?
6. If, in an Islamic State, an apostate is to be executed, is this not practising "compulsion in religion"?

Surah iii.7 reads: "He it is Who hath revealed unto thee the scrip-

ture wherein are clear revelations—They are the substance of the Book—and others which are allegorical. But those in whose hearts is doubt pursue, forsooth, that which is allegorical seeking to cause dissension by seeking to explain it."

7. The clear revelations—*Āyāt-i-Muḥkamāt*—because their meaning is clear, need no interpretation. Is this true? Is it assumed that the same verses are clear to everyone? If so, does this imply that everyone thinks alike, or possesses the same degree of intelligence?

8. Is Surah ii.256 among the *Āyāt-i-Muḥkamāt*? If not, what are some of the verses that are definitely revelations?

9. Is Surah iv.3 on (polygamy) allegorical? Is it a clear revelation? If it is clear, why should it be so disputed, and so variously interpreted? If a person feels the verse is clear, need he resort to Ḥadīth at all? (The concern here is not in the problem of polygamy as such, but in the problem of Quranic interpretation).

10. When differing verses of the Qurʾān touch on the same subject, how does one determine which is the over-riding verse? If it could be shown that one was the last revealed, would that be sufficient? If so, would there be value in a chronological arrangement of the Qurʾān?

11. In an Islamic State would individuals have a right to their own individual interpretations of the Qurʾān on the basis of Surah iii.7? Would they have the right to refuse to accept the decision of a commission referring to the Qurʾān, if such a decision disagreed with their individual judgment and interpretation? If not, what is the validity of the verse?

12. How does one justify the missionary zeal of Islam with the Quranic verse explaining that God created different patterns for different peoples, but that they are all God's patterns?

13. Does man's increasing knowledge of the physical world — through astronomy, physics, chemistry, etc. — enable him to better understand the Qurʾān?

14. The Qurʾān constantly cites the Jewish and Christian scriptures as "revealed books." Many Biblical scholars, however have suggested that many of these scriptures are merely historical documents, etc., sometimes written by more than one author, and bearing little evidence of revelation. Does the Qurʾān use this word "revelation" in a particular sense, are the Biblical scholars wrong, or are we to assume the Jewish and Christian scriptures have been changed since Muhammad's time?

15. Is birth within Islam tantamount to a free personal choice in Islam?

MAULANA MAUDŪDĪ'S REPLIES

The proper method to be adopted for arriving at a correct interpretation of the Qurʾān is first of all to ponder over its words and the

construction thereof according to the requirements of the Arabic language; then to look at it in the setting of its context; then other verses relating to that particular subject, interspersed at different places in the Qur'ān, should be collected with a view to determining which of the possible interpretations of the verse in question is in consonance with them, and which is at variance. Obviously enough, if a particular assertion of a certain person is open to two or more interpretations, only that interpretation shall be deemed correct which is in harmony with his other assertions on that subject. Having attempted to derive the meaning of the Qur'ān from the Qur'ān itself, one must ascertain what light is thrown on the meaning of the verse in question by the precepts and practices of the personage who, in fact, presented the Qur'ān, and also what meaning of the verse was understood by his immediate followers.

Having elucidated the principles so far, I take up the particular verse quoted as an example. The words of the verse are: "There is no compulsion in religion." According to the Arabic language there can be two interpretations of the words "in religion", viz. (a) "In respect of adopting the religion" and (b) "In the Islamic way of life." The question is, which of these two interpretations is preferable? This cannot be decided by the mere wording of this verse, and one must refer to the context in which it is used. Its context is this: at the outset, a clear concept of God's Oneness and His attributes has been presented, a concept altogether different from the multi-form polytheistic concepts of God obtaining among the various religious orders of the time, and that distinctive concept constitutes the fundamental article of faith in the scheme of the religion towards which the Qur'ān extends its invitation. It is after this enunciation of the Oneness of God and the Divine attributes that it has been said, "*There is no compulsion in religion.* The right path stands out clear from the wrong one. Whoever rejects the Evil and believes in God has grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold that never breaks. And God heareth and knoweth all things. God is the Protector of those who have faith. From the depths of darkness He will lead them forth into light; as for those who reject faith their patrons are the evil ones; from light they will lead them into the depths of darkness..."

In this context the sentence in italics clearly means that nobody is to be forced to adopt the aforesaid belief about God. The right faith has been presented with the fullest clarity *vis-à-vis* the wrong beliefs, and if a person discards the wrong beliefs and recognizes God, in the said manner, he will himself be benefitted, and whosoever refuses to accept the same will himself be a loser.

If you look at the Qur'ān as a whole you will find that penalties have been proposed in regard to various crimes. Commandments have been given for suppressing many moral evils, a number of things have been forbidden, certain things have been declared obligatory and

binding, and Muslims have been ordained to obey the Prophet and those from amongst themselves who are entrusted with authority. To enforce these commandments resort to some sort of coercive power is, obviously, inevitable, be it the power of the State or the power inherent in the moral pressure exercised by society as such.

It is thus abundantly clear that by saying: "There is no compulsion in religion" the Qur'ān does not signify there is no place, in any case whatsoever, for the use of coercive power in the Islamic system of life. It only means that there is no place for compulsion in the matter of embracing the religion of Islam. Whosoever embraces Islam should do so out of his own free will, and whosoever refuses to do so should not be compelled to accept it by force.

Further light is thrown on this subject by the behavior of the Prophet (Peace be on him) and his associates who received their training directly under him. They never compelled any non-Muslim to embrace Islam. But in the case of those who joined the Muslim society by willingly embracing Islam it was made compulsory to observe the Islamic commandments. And to this end not only was moral and social pressure brought to bear upon them, but in some cases the force of government also was employed. During their days a very large number of non-Muslims became subjects of the Islamic state. They were given unabridged freedom in matters of faith, worship and religious ceremonies. Their personal law was kept intact. But so far as the public law of the Islamic state was concerned it was one, and was applied to them just as it was applied to Muslims themselves.

This much regarding the basic issue raised. Now to answer questions.

(1) I am not in possession of full information in regard to the treatment meted out to the Bahais in Iran, and, therefore, am unable to express my views on the subject. But your query in regard to the Qadiani problem in Pakistan appears to be based on a gross misunderstanding of the situation. No one in Pakistan ever demanded that the Qadianis should be expelled from Pakistan, or that they should be exterminated or forced to renounce Qadianism or be deprived of normal civic rights. What was demanded, and that demand is still present, was no more than this: that the self-imposed separation of Qadianis from Muslims in matters of the basic articles of faith, religious practices and social order, already *de facto,* should be recognized *de jure,* and that there was no justification whatsoever for Qadianis to be held to constitute a part of the Muslim society. Think for yourself by what logic this demand could be considered as one in contravention to the Quranic verse in question. Does non-compulsion in religion mean that a sect—a sect deemed by all Muslims as outside the pale of their religion and which, having declared all Muslims as heretics has, for all practical purposes, thoroughly separated itself from them—should be recognized by Muslims to be within the

fold of Islam? It would be quite contrary to the facts to hold that the disturbances of March 1953 were directed against the Qadianis, and it is a mis-nomer to call them "Anti-Qadiani Disturbances." This title has created the misunderstanding, in the minds of those unaware of the real situation, that perhaps the Muslims were out to kill and exterminate the Qadianis. The fact is that those disturbances took place because of tension between the government and the people. On the one hand, people in general pressed the government to concede the above mentioned demand to declare Qadianis a non-Muslim community and, on the other, the government wanted to crush their agitation by force. Thus the clash was between the government and the people, and not between the Qadianis and the Muslims. People attacked the person and property of some Qadianis only when they were convinced (and there were quite weighty reasons for this conviction) that certain Qadianis had put on police and military uniforms and were killing Muslims during the disturbances.

(2) There is no discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims in an Islamic state in the matter of taxation. No doubt in the early stages non-Muslim tradesmen were required to pay a higher terminal fee than the Muslims, but this was not on the basis of any permanent law of the Sharī'ah, nor was it designed to force or persuade the non-Muslim businessman to embrace Islam. It was rather an expedient which had, for the time-being, been adopted with a view to making the Muslims business-minded because, during those days, Muslims had mostly taken to civil and military services and the entire economic life (trade, arts, crafts, agriculture, etc.) of the newly-conquered countries had been left entirely in the hands of non-Muslims. If one were to object that this preference could prove a compelling force for a marginal businessman to become a Muslim just for maintaining his means of subsistence, I would say that there is no justification for such a conjecture, because as soon as he embraced Islam Zakāt had to be levied upon him, making the burden definitely heavier for him than that of Jizyah and the terminal tax put together. Zakāt would have been charged from him at the rate of two and a half per cent a year on his entire business-capital, household ornaments and accumulated wealth, while even the richest non-Muslim had to pay no more than forty-eight dirhams (about three dollars) yearly, and in the matter of terminal tax he had, at the maximum, to pay fifty per cent more than the Muslims.

(3) This question has already been answered in the course of my introductory explanation.

(4 & 5) The commentator referred to by you does not appear to mean that until such time as Muslims came into power they were free to coerce people into embracing Islam and that they are required to abandon coercive measures only when they had attained power. He seems to have proceeded rather on the assumption that the question

of compulsion can after all arise only when a person or group actually possess some sort of coercive influence and power over another person or group. Otherwise it is obviously meaningless to tell a powerless person that he should not resort to coercive measures. I hope you will not mind if I say that you have inferred just the opposite meaning from the words of the commentator, and a meaning that is logically untenable, as well.

(6) The law of Islam about apostates seems to be in contravention of this verse, but actually it is not so. The verse relates to those who have not entered the pale of Islam. In their case only Islam ordains that they shall not be compelled to enter the fold of Islam, while the Islamic law about apostacy relates only to persons who, having once entered the fold of Islam, want to desert it. The real purpose behind the use of force against such deserters is not to retain them within the fold through coercive measures, but to save Islamic society, the bedrock of the Islamic state, from disintegration. Just as the Islamic law does not permit a Muslim within the Islamic state to publicly renounce Islam, similarly it does not permit a non-Muslim Dhimmī, also residing within the territory of the state, to openly disown allegiance to the state. And, so far as I know, no state would be prepared to brook its own disintegration. In regard to this matter every state has to make a distinction between aliens on the one hand and, on the other hand, those who, having once owned allegiance to it, propose to disown or abrogate it. And no state on earth can afford to treat the two equally. Is the position of one who does not adopt American citizenship or British nationality quite the same as that of one who, while remaining on American or British territory, renounces such allegiance after having once adopted it? Will the two be meted out similar treatment, or will the latter be permitted to abandon his nationality and yet remain in the state? Or would a state which does not at all accede to the American Federation be meted out the same treatment as one which proposes to secede after joining it?

Now to take up the other verse cited from Surah iii. To appreciate the answers to your questions relating to this verse it is necessary that you should thoroughly understand the respective imports of the two categories of verses: *Āyāt-i-Muḥkamāt* and *Āyāt-i-Mutashābihāt,* and the difference between the meanings of the two. The symbolical verses, i.e., *Āyāt-i-Mutashābihāt,* are those which deal with realities beyond the ken of human perception. Since these realities do not come within the purview of human experience and observation directly (and for this reason no human language possesses words specifically coined for the expression of those realities), it is inevitable that words invented by human beings for perceptible things have to be used for these realities. For example, words or modes of expression such as life, sight, or His being in heaven, or His love, or His anger, may just give an idea of the Reality, and this is all that is aimed at. Yet

to grasp with the help of these words or expressions a thoroughly complete and elaborate conception of the Reality, and to comprehend fully the nature of the imperceptible realities is impossible. That is why the Qur'ān holds those who try to indulge in such allegorical verses to be victims of a wrong mentality; these words are incapable of being given a precise meaning, or explained in a manner which would make the Reality fully comprehensible by man.

The verses of clear meaning, on the contrary, are those which deal with palpable realities relating to Man and Universe and such problems and matters as come within the range of human observation and experience, or contain injunctions and instructions which must be acted upon. The words used in these verses are those which have been coined in human language for the very things and matters which form the subject matter of these verses, and can therefore be explained and determined intelligibly. An effort to determine their meaning is possible as well as permissible, and even desirable according to the Sharī'ah, in so far as it is necessary for understanding the meaning of the Qur'ān, and for receiving guidance therefrom. This effort, to be fruitful, is conditioned by one provision: that it be made in good faith and with a view to seeking guidance. It should also be in keeping with those universally accepted reasonable methods adopted for determining the real meaning and intention of any statement, and not with a view to molding it according to one's own desires and views.

(7) A reply to this question becomes redundant after the explanation given above. Verses of established meaning do not signify that they are verses "which do not call for any interpretation at all." On the contrary, the Qur'ān, by forbidding indulgence in symbolical verses, diverts man's attention towards these verses in so far as these, to the exclusion of the symbolical verses, are the proper objects to which all efforts at meditation, contemplation, probing and research should be directed.

(8) The verse "There is no compulsion in religion" is definitely one of those verses which have an established meaning, as the meaning and significance of "religion," "compulsion," and "the fact of there being no compulsion in religion" can very well be determined with the help of lexicon, grammar of the language, context, other statements of the Qur'ān on the subject, Sunnah, Ijmā' (consensus) and Qiyās (analogy). Similarly, all those verses of the Qur'ān have a definite or established meaning in which it has been demanded that man accept or reject, or fulfil in act, or desist from, a certain thing. Similarly, verses dealing with matters and problems within the range of human experience are verses of established meaning.

(9) After the aforesaid explanation it can very well be understood that Surah iv.3 is not allegorical, but one of definite import. The query as to "Why, if the verse is one of definite import, should it be disputed?" seems to be based on many a misconception. Firstly,

you seem to hold that: "In regard to a clear verse there should not be any differences of interpretation," and this misconception has emanated from the idea that a clear verse should not at all require any interpretation whatsoever. Secondly, you hold that in regard to the interpretation of this verse there have arisen many disputes and the there are wide differences concerning it. But the fact is that among the ʿUlamāʾ of Islam there has been complete unanimity of opinion in regard to the meaning of this verse, and for over thirteen centuries it has been held that this verse permits a person to keep more than one wife, while restricting the number to four at a time. It, however, imposes the condition of justice, and by justice is meant "justice in treatment and rights" and not "equal attachment." As regards the interpretation some Muslims here and there have begun to give since the last decade of the 19th century, which has led to the misunderstanding that there are wide differences concerning the interpretation of this verse, I would like to state unequivocally that these are not "interpretations," but "distortions of meaning," which cannot be given place within the limits of the term "interpretation" of the Qurʾān. These "interpretations" have, in fact, been put forth by persons who take their guidance not from the Qurʾān, but from western minds, and then try to force the Qurʾān to justify that stand. To try thus to clothe a verse with a false meaning is sheer hypocrisy and dishonesty. If I were to feel that the Quranic point of view in this matter, or in regard to any other matter, is wrong and that of the western thinkers is right, I would declare my faith in your concept by openly rejecting the Qurʾān, and would never have hesitated in saying that I am not a Muslim. And this, I believe, should be the attitude of every sincere and honest person. But I am sorry to say that many western people encourage hypocrites amongst us simply because they have an affinity with them in many affairs of life. This affinity generates an appreciation for their stand and their hypocrisy; the real motivating factor goes uncondemned.

In connection with this question you have raised yet another point, that if a person feels the verse is a clear one why should he resort to Ḥadīth? My contention is that whether a person considers the Qurʾān to be a product of the brain of the Prophet Muḥammad, or whether he takes it to be a Book of God and accepts the Prophet as the Prophet of God, it would be wrong to contend that in order to understand the Qurʾān one does not require the help of the verbal and practical elucidations given by Muḥammad. If he considers it to be a product of the Prophet's brain he must concede that the explanation given by the author himself is most indicative of the real meaning. And if he believes it to be the word of God and acknowledges that He had commissioned the Prophet to impart these teachings to the people, then, too, he has no alternative but to accept the position that only that meaning of the word of God is correct which was understood by

the Prophet to be the correct one. Now, whether or not a particular Ḥadīth ascribed to Muḥammad is genuine, and on what grounds, is quite a different question. But there can be no denying the position that one cannot afford to dispense with Ḥadīth if one wants to understand the Qur'ān correctly.

(10) If there are to be found two different commandments in the Qur'ān in respect to the same issue, the later will be deemed to have repealed the former. This, however, does not at all necessitate a rearranging of the entire Qur'ān in the chronological order of its revelation. In the present arrangement one can very well determine, with the help of authentic traditions, which of the two commandments was revealed earlier and which later.

(11) In an Islamic state any person possessed of erudition and learning is entitled to interpret the Qur'ān. But his interpretation cannot be a law for all Muslims. Only that interpretation will have the force of law which is adopted by men of erudition and learning by unanimity or a majority of opinion, or which is held as correct by a competent court.

(12) You have not given any reference to the verse you have in mind here. However, if it is Surah xxii.67; then it does not mean what you have understood it to mean. The correct meaning of the verse is that for the people of the age of every Prophet God had prescribed a way, and that alone was valid for that age. That is, nobody had the right to dispute or challenge it. For this age God has ordained a way to be taught through the Prophet Muḥammad, and nobody has a right to dispute it, for this alone is valid now.

(13) There is no doubt that an increase in the knowledge of man about the world and its realities will increase his insight into the Qur'ān. From this, however, it does not follow that he will begin to understand the Qur'ān better than Muḥammad and his direct disciples, nor that whosoever acquires a considerable knowledge of the world through astronomy, physics and chemistry, should necessarily be deemed capable of understanding the Qur'ān better. For a proper appreciation of the Qur'ān the foremost condition is that one acknowledge it as the Book of God, recognise it as the fountain-head of guidance be conversant with those essential branches of learning which are necessary for a proper understanding of the Qur'ān, and devote sufficient time to a thoughtful study of the Qur'ān and the Islamic system of thought and life. And yet, despite all this, no one can claim to understand the Qur'ān better than the Prophet whom God had Himself commissioned to teach His Book (or who, according to those who do not believe in his prophethood, was himself the author of that Book).

(14) It is not the Books of the "Old Testament" or the "New Testament" to which the Qur'ān testifies. It is the "Torah," the "Gospel," and the "Psalms of David" to which the Qur'ān

testifies. The Jews did not preserve the "Torah" as a book in itself, but had various portions thereof incorporated in the first five Books of the Old Testament, in the portion dealing with the history of the children of Israel. One can very well sort out those fragments of that original "Torah" from these books with the help of the following signs.

Whenever a sentence commences; "The Lord said unto Moses," or "The Lord thus ordained," or "Moses, addressing the Chidren of Israel, spoke thus," there is every probability that it is a fragment of that original Torah. The same is true of the Psalms of David. The entire Book of Psalms in the Old Testament is not testified to by the Qurʾān. The "Psalms of David" alone have been testified to by it, and some of its portions have been incorporated into the "Book of Psalms."

It is equally true of the Gospel also. The followers of the Prophet Jesus did not preserve it as a book in itself. But the biographers of Jesus Christ—Matthew, Mark, Luke and John—have incorporated in their respective books such fragments as had reached them by word of mouth, and they can be sorted out with the help of the following signs: "Jesus said so and so," or "Jesus narrated this parable," or "Addressing the people, Jesus delivered this sermon."

If you were to accept the suggestion, and sort out all such portions of the Torah, the Psalms and the Gospel from the Old and New Testaments, and then compare them with the Qurʾān, you would find very slight differences between the teachings contained therein and those of the Qurʾān. And even those slight difference may be explained in view of the fact that the Qurʾān exists as a permanent book and in its original wording, and the other three books have neither been preserved with their original wording, nor have they been allowed to remain as "books." It is very difficult for me to say whether or not the three books existed as "books" during the times of the Holy Prophet. But so far as "Torah" (The Law of Moses) is concerned, it appears from some of the descriptions contained in the Old Testament itself that the Jews possessed it as a "book" for quite a long while, and our Aḥādīth also indicate that a copy of the same was available to the Jews of Medina during the time of the Prophet.

(15) The answer to this question [1] has two parts: one of principle and the other of practicality. The principle is that no distinction can be made in the matter of injunctions as between the born and voluntary followers of a social, political or other system, nor has any system ever permitted such a distinction. The maintenance and strength of a social system mostly depends on its permanent adherents or those who

[1] This question and the answer herewith were not included in the original interview and are thus not covered by the permission of that occasion. There seems, however, no reasonable impediment to their publication here since they follow closely the points made in Maulana Maudūdī's: *Punishment Prescribed by Islam for an Apostate,* a work translated from Urdu into English by the Jamaᶜat itself.

follow it in a steadfast manner and thus guarantee its continuity. If continuity in citizenship and adherence to a system by each generation of citizens of a state and followers of a faith were to be regarded as doubtful or uncertain, then the very foundations of the social fabric would always remain uncertain and never attain any strength. The proposition, consequently, that citizenship of a state acquired through birth should be an optional affair is on the face of it absurd; no social system, state, or religion in the world has ever adopted this course of action.

Practically, of course, very few birthright citizens ever even contemplate leaving the social system into which they were born. It is, however, apparent that no change can be reasonably claimed or effected in the principle for the sake of a handful of such individuals when it would evidently expose the life of the whole community to danger and dissatisfaction. If a few such individuals think it so essential to revolt against the collective system they have two alternatives open to them: they should do so either after leaving its limits or, if they are really true to their conviction and possess a genuine desire to replace their ancestral faith and collective system by another one they should risk their lives for their ideal, and offer the sacrifice without which no system can ever be altered.

In view of my earlier remarks on the question of the non-secession of a Muslim and its equation with nonsecession of a state from the American Union, let me add as follows. All objections critics raise against the prescription of capital punishment for apostasy in Islam result from looking at Islam as a "mere religion." Islam is not a "mere religion," but a state system which stands to uphold not the authority or sovereignty of a person, family, faction, or any nation, but that of an ideology and order of life and its principles. Indeed, we quite agree with these critics when and where Islam occupies the position of a "mere religion." There we too do not believe in punishing the apostates. If the religion itself occupies the sovereign position, however, then religious law becomes the law of the land. It is religion that stands responsible for the maintenance of law and order. Under such conditions religion certainly has the right to punish the people who repudiate it, after having sworn allegiance and loyalty to it.

This matter, to be understood in its true proportions, should not be mixed up with arguments concerning the propriety of a religious state itself. The real question is whether a state which exercises sovereign power over a piece of territory is, or is not, entitled for the sake of its own preservation, to declare such acts to be criminal as would upset and disintegrate its organization. Has there ever been a state which has not exercised such a right? Is there now any state which does not exercise such a right?

Take the case of Britain and America, two of the most advanced

states of the modern age. English law, broadly speaking, deals with two classes of people: British subjects and aliens. But no British subject is entitled by law to adopt any other nationality while residing within British territories. In time of war, even when a British subject is outside British territory, he is not entitled to forsake British nationality and adopt another, swearing loyalty to a state which is at war with the British sovereign. Nor may a British subject maintain any relations with the enemies of the sovereign, rendering such enemies any help or assistance that would weaken the power of attack or defence of the king and country. American laws in this respect are very similar, the primary difference being that the status assigned by Great Britain to the Crown has been assigned by America to the national sovereignty of the United States.

The constitutional law of Islam treats all those persons as "non-Muslims" who are not bound by ties of loyalty to God and His Messenger, and seeks to classify them in respect of their status and rights. Thus a temporary visitor, who is afforded protection, but not the rights of citizenship, is treated as a "Musta'min." Native-born inhabitants who are not prepared to swear outright loyalty to its sovereign (God and His Messenger) are given the right (contrary to the constitutional laws of any other country in the world) to reside as "non-Muslims" in the country. If they agree to abide as obedient and faithful subjects the Islamic law treats them as Dhimmīs (covenanted subjects), and gives them not merely full protection but extensive rights of citizenship as well. Non-Muslims coming from outside may, by fulfilling the conditions laid down for a Dhimmī, be included in this category. In an Islamic state the rights of *full* citizenship are meant solely for those persons who are Muslims—that is, bound by loyalty and obedience to God and His Hessenger, whether they were born within the state or emigrated into it.

But if a Muslim wants to become a non-Muslim, he must leave the state to do it. If he tries to do this while residing within the state, he will not merely be unable to secure the rights of a Dhimmī or a Musta'min, but such action on his part will be considered an act of high treason.

Those who wonder at the different attitude adopted by Islam towards a non-believer and an apostate forget and ignore the fact that there is no social organization in the world which would extend equal treatment to the non-members and its seceders. He who secedes is penalized in every community. Human nature necessarily draws a distinction between those who do not join a group and those who cut themselves off from it after joining it. This is true between an individual and the community, and it is true between one community and another. States which join a federation while being initially at liberty to join or not to join are, after accession thereto, prevented by virtue of the constitution from seceding. Where no explicit provision

exists in a constitution the use of the right of secesson often leads to war. In the 19th century eleven Southern States, believing that every state should have the right of seccession, and that the Federal Government did not have the right to force any state to return to the Federation, seceded from the Union and set up their own Confederacy. Upon this the Federal Government declared war against the seceding states, and after a number of years of great bloodshed these were forced to join the Union again. Herein the Federal Government was merely recognizing that a social organization by its very nature depends for its success on its inherent strength, and this in turn rests on the fact that the elements making up the organization should have the greatest confidence in the union. "Another instance is found in the history of Switzerland which went to war against seven of its component states when they thought of seceding from the confederacy in 1847."

Associations for recreation and sport, which are no more important than children's doll-houses, may give preference to an individual's freedom over their organization, but institutions embodying great social aims cannot be prepared for anything involving danger to their very existence. Hence a state, an army, and parties formed for the high purpose of serving important social ideals and undertaking hazardous tasks, as well as other serious organizations of a like nature, are compelled to slam the doors on those who wish to retrace their steps. Thus they prevent their component elements from disintegration. There is no more successful method of acquiring strong and reliable elements than warning the entrants beforehand that secession from the party would entail sure death. However, this right vests in, and can be lawfully exercised only by, an organizational system which itself is wholesome and legal in its nature. As for an unwholesome and evil system — its very existence is an act of injustice; the exercise of force to keep its elements together will be an act of still greater injustice.

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THE ABOLITION OF THE SHARʿĪ COURTS IN EGYPT. I

The recent abolition of the Sharʿī and communal courts in Egypt marks a crucial point in the religious and political development of Egypt and perhaps of other Arab countries. This decisive step which has aroused vehement discussion in Egypt and other Arab countries, has not received the attention it deserves on the part of Islamists and students of the Middle East [1]. It represents the culmination of a process that has been operating for nearly a century to bring to an end the six centuries old Sharʿī State in Egypt. We shall attempt to place this event in its historical context and to examine the forces which have been at work. But before doing so, it seems well to consider the immediate aspects of the law: its substance, the reasons for its promulgation, its significance, and the immediate reactions to it in Egypt and other Arab countries.

The text of the new law appeared in *Al-Ahrām* on September 22nd, 1955. The law consists of thirteen brief articles:

Article one declares the abolition of the Sharʿī and the communal courts effective January 1st, 1956. Suits that will have remained unresolved by December 31st, 1955, were to be transferred to the national courts which should deal with them in accordance with their own code of procedure and in accordance with the present law.

Article two regulates the mode of transfer of suits in various levels of Sharʿī and communal courts to the respective levels of national courts.

Article three provides for the establishment within the national jurisdiction of courts of first instance and of appeal to deal, according to the national code of procedure, with matters pertaining to personal status and to *waqfs* that used to be in the exclusive competence of the Sharʿī and the communal courts. It also provides that in matters pertaining to personal status, the court of first instance shall be composed of a bench of three judges which *may* include one or two members of the benches of the equivalent Sharʿī courts who will have been attached to the civil cadres. The same applies to the courts of appeal, except that there only one Sharʿī judge *may* be included in the bench. In the courts of last instance the president of the Sharʿī court ***must*** be included in the bench as member.

Article five establishes that in matters of personal status and of *waqfs* falling within the competence of the Sharʿī or communal courts, the national courts shall follow the civil code of procedure except where

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[1] To the best of my knowledge, no study has been made of this law and its implications except for two articles by Joseph Hajjar in *Proche Orient Chrétien* (Arab Jerusalem), Vol. 5 No. 4, 1955 and Vol. 6 No. 1, 1956. The first article is a detailed factual presentation to which I am indebted for factual material presented in this paper; the second article is an historical interpretation to which the present articles are almost diametrically opposed.

special regulations had been issued for the Sharᶜī courts and for other complementary laws.

Article six provides that in disputes of personal status of *waqfs*, the sentences shall be pronounced in accordance with article 280 (of decree § 18 of 1931) of the legislation which concerned the Sharᶜī jurisdiction; that is, that judgments shall be issued according to the most approved opinion of the school of Abū Ḥanīfa except where specific legislation has been issued. As for disputes of personal status of Egyptians of non-Muslim confession and who have organized communal jurisdiction at the time of the promulgation of this law, the sentences shall be issued according to their own legislation with due regard to public order.

Article seven: change of confession or communal affiliation of a party to the dispute in the course of the procedure shall not affect its march, unless the change is done in the favor of Islam, in which case the first clause of article six shall be applied.

Article nine provides for merging the judges of the Sharᶜī courts of all levels in the cadres of the national courts, the committees on personal status or the technical committees of the Ministry of Justice. Sentences in matters of personal status shall be executed according to the dispositions established for the Sharᶜī courts by the Decree of 1907 (Article twelve). Finally, article thirteen abrogates previous regulations, laws and parts thereof which contradict the present law.

The official reasons for the new law were stated in an explanatory memorandum which is of crucial importance not only for its avowed purpose, but also because it reveals with unprecedented clarity some of the main forces that have been shaping the character and orientation of modern Egyptian society. This justifies us in quoting large extracts from this document. [2]

The memorandum opens with the statement that:

1. *"The rules of public law require that the sovereignty of the state be complete and absolute in the interior, and that all those who live in it,* without distinction of nationality, *be submitted to the laws of the country, to its courts and to a single juridical jurisdiction,* taking into account the diversity of the conflicts *ratione materiae* and of the laws applied to them. But *in Egypt the situation contradicts this principle.* The jurisdictions to which the Egyptians themselves submit in matters of personal status are numerous. Each jurisdiction applies its own legislation and its own peculiar procedure without any bond uniting them, and without any organism to preside over its judicial activity. This has been the situation despite the fact that the nation has

[2] The numbering of paragraphs and the italics are supplied in order to facilitate later references.

already reassumed its judicial prerogatives with regard to foreigners, so that the national courts have become exclusively competent in all their conflicts, even in those that pertain to their personal status.

2. *Egypt has inherited from the past a multiplicity of judicial organizations in matters of personal status.* Thus the Shar^{c}ī courts were established, and then, in parallel, the communal courts; then the communal courts multiplied and diversified until each community obtained a particular jurisdiction, *with all the particular legislation and procedure that this implies.* This led to anarchy, and, consequently, to damage to the parties... The fundamental source establishing the limits of the competence of the communal courts is to be sought in the *Hatti Humayun* promulgated in Turkey in 1856, and in other regulations, ordinances and circulars preceding or subsequent to it. All these are vestiges of Ottoman legislation which applied then to Egypt. These legislative vestiges were not inspired in their substance and their explanations by a desire for clarity and precision; they were, in reality, the fruit of premeditated ignorance which was imposed by the political circumstances at the time.

3. From this situation many conflicts arose between the different jurisdictions, giving rise to contradictory sentences on the same issue... Thus the sentences piled up by the hundreds, seeking in vain a way to execution. *It was natural,* therefore, *that having suppressed the privileges which certain citizens of foreign nations enjoyed,* and having submitted their subjects to the regular regime of justice before the national courts, *there should not remain in the country any vestige of an exceptional organization, which would limit the power and the sovereignty of the state vis a vis certain categories of citizens...*

4. That sentences concerning the very status of the person be carried out by non-responsible jurisdictions, acting without the intervention of the state, or, that these jurisdictions be submitted to foreign organisms, acting outside the national territory... (Rome, for instance) and that some judges in the communal councils be foreigners and ignorant of the language of the parties and that they pronounce their sentences regarding Egyptians in a foreign language, all this is in opposition to national sovereignty...

5. From all parts ceaseless complaints have been formulated against the situation of the jurisdiction of personal status. The parties criticized them bitterly, pointing out particularly the absence of the minimum requirements which would facilitate and guarantee the procedure of these courts. The non-Muslim communities possess fourteen different jurisdictions, some of which sit only at very long intervals and in localities remote from the homes of the parties. This makes the process of justice very onerous for some persons and shows signs of tyranny and oppression. The juridical rules which most of these jurisdictions apply are not written, and it is not easy

for the common party to know them because they are dispersed in the columns of heavenly books, the explanations and commentaries of some jurists, members of the clergy, and are written in Latin, Greek, Syriac, Hebrew, Armenian, or Coptic — all languages not understood by the majority of the parties... The rules of forming the courts, of procedure, and of appeal are neither uniform nor stable . The judiciary fees are not unified; some of these courts do not even have any regulation in this matter. Most of these courts do not even have a regular judicial corps to fulfil their obligations... In the face of this abnormal situation, in the face of this anarchy which has become unbearable, many attempts at reform were made in the past. However fragmentary and limited these attempts were, they did not succeed because of certain opposition which they encountered at the time. This situation remained unchanged until our days; *its only victims are the parties and the sovereignty of the nation.*

6. Since the Revolution has set for itself the task of realizing the reforms necessary for the country and of dealing a deadly blow to evil in all its manifestations, the difficulties mentioned above could not stop the government from fulfilling its duties with regard to the judicial organization by facilitating the paths to justice to all its citizens without distinction or partiality... *The government cannot suffer the existence on the national territory of judiciary autonomies which impose their will upon it, oppose its policy of reform, or, lastly, choose their own way of reform...*

The rest of the memorandum merely repeats some of the points and touches on the rights of the Sharʿī judges and lawyers without adding anything new except in the interpretation of the clauses referring to change of confession or communal affiliation. Referring to article six, the memorandum says:

7. "This last paragraph is nothing but the application of a recognized principle whereby the changing of religion confers upon the person concerned the rights of his new religion. This rule is completely similar to that which governs change of nationality. The Egyptian legislator has already adopted it in Article 13— of the civil code which says that divorce is subject to the legislation of the country to which the husband belongs at the time of the divorce. The legislation that governs the process and the separation is that of the husband at the time of the opening of the process."

The publication of the law was followed by an immediate energetic reaction on the part of the Christian minorities in Egypt. Within a few days the spiritual heads of all the Christian communities in Egypt assembled in the seat of the Coptic-Orthodox patriarchate to concert a plan of action. At the end of the meeting they unanimously adopted a memorandum which they addressed to President ʿAbd al-Nāṣir on

October 3rd, 1955.[3] After the appropriate preliminaries, the memorandum asserted in unusually vigorous terms that

> "the new legislation of personal status far from fulfilling its avowed aim (establishing equality among all the citizens) destroys in an organized manner the liberty proclaimed by the revolution, tramples on the rights of the communities, and threatens the very existence of Christianity in Egypt by authorizing in a legal manner the fraudulent manoeuvres in religious matters about which all the previous régimes complained..."

The prelates then went on to say that in fact only the communal courts have been abolished by the new law; the Sharʿī courts have been abolished only in form and in appearance, since the *Sharʿī qāḍīs,* who are men of religion in Islam, will in fact sit in the national courts to judge matters of personal status for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Furthermore, the new law "does not impose on everybody a single civil legislation which deprives Muslims and non-Muslims equally of the application of their own religious law — on the contrary, the Muslim legislation will in fact be applied to Muslims and even to non-Muslims" in at least two instances: when the parties are not of the same Christian denomination; and when one of the parties adopts Islam even in the course of the consideration of the case.

The memorandum was particularly vehement about the last instance which, in the eyes of its authors, reflects "trafficking in religion, which we have so often combatted and which men of law have fought in all régimes, having now become permitted and legal by virtue of a law which gives it the security and the protection of the judges themselves." The leaders insisted that marriage in Christianity is essentially a religious contract governed by immutable Divine law — "No man has the right to separate that which God has united." Consequently, they asserted that Christians can definitely not accept the new situation, and urged the President to continue the beautiful tradition of allowing Christians to have their own religious courts, which dates from the days of Muḥammad and the Qurʾān and had been honored by the greatest Caliphs and Sultans. They pointed to the danger for Muslims of establishing a precedent of enforcing the religious law of the majority on the minority; i.e., in the two cases mentioned above

> "Suppose that the great powers accept the demand of the Arab states to re-integrate the Palestinian refugees in their homes in Israel; what would be their position if Israel imposed on them the Mosaic law under the pretext of safeguarding her sovereignty? And what would be the position of the Muslims of Ethiopia if the Sharʿī courts were abolished?"

History shows that communal jurisdiction is not opposed to national

[3] Cf. Joseph Hajjar, "La suppression des tribunaux confessionnels en Egypte", *Proche Orient Chrétien,* Vol. 5 No. 4, 1955.

sovereignty. "The proof is that Islam has protected and re-inforced these jurisdictions precisely when it was at the summit of its power and glory..."

Despite the energetic reply of the religious leaders it would be a mistake to suppose on that ground that the new law met with great disfavor in all Christian circles. Indeed an assistant of the Greek-Catholic Patriarch referred astonishingly in an article in the Christian organ *Al-Masarrah,* of October 1955 to the "favorable and even enthusiastic support" with which the law was received in certain Christian quarters. The reference is undoubtedly to certain secular leaders of the Coptic-Orthodox communal council who had dethroned the Patriarch and had submitted to the government, in March 1954, a project to settle the dispute with the dethroned Patriarch, which secularized completely the courts of personal status of their community. It seems that, despite the reference to the Christian conception of marriage, the signatories of the memorandum would not have been unwilling to accept an entirely civil law of personal status, and that their main objections were motivated by the discrimination against the personnel of the communal courts, who would not be sitting in the national courts like their Sharʿī colleagues, and by the encouragement of apostasy among Christians.

It would be unfair in Egypt's present circumstances to judge Muslim reaction from the reception of the law by the press and by the official leaders of the ʿulamāʾ. On the whole, the press contented itself with repeating the arguments expounded in the explanatory memorandum in more or less exalted terms. Typical is *Al-Ahrām*'s comment in its issue of September 22, 1955:

> "By this happy and daring step the government of the revolution has dealt a fatal blow to the anarchy which was the shame of Egypt. Many were the complaints under the previous régimes, but the partial attempts at reform failed all of them because of obstacles which existed at the time. Now the government of the revolution brings this effective remedy which extirpates the causes of complaint, unifies the organization of justice, guarantees the sovereignty of the state, and distributes justice among men in a way that secures their confidence in it..."

As for the leaders of the ʿulamāʾ, *Al-Ahrām* of September 28th, 1955, reported that on the previous day the Rector of Al-Azhar, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Tājj visited the President to thank him on behalf of the 'ulamā' for having taken the "liberating step" of suppressing the Sharʿī and the communal courts. On the 27th of the same month, *Al-Ahrām* published a note by the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Ḥasan al-Maʾmūn, in which he defended the Sharʿī courts against the campaign of direct attacks and insinuations which had been launched on the occasion of

the discovery of some abuses in their procedure perpetrated by one qāḍī. The suppression of the courts had followed immediately upon this campaign. Shaikh al-Maʾmūn was trying to break in the mind of the public the association of the two events, which the authorities had undoubtedly sought to establish: "The reason for the unification of the various jurisdictions of personal status is to put an end to the repeated complaints against the contradictory sentences issued by the courts. There were other reasons, all of which are enumerated in the explanatory memorandum. They do not touch in any way the integrity or the behavior of the Sharʿī courts," which have known how to preserve the Muslim traditions despite all the secular vicissitudes. Shaikh al-Maʾmūn pointed out with satisfaction that Muslim law would continue to govern the verdicts of the national courts and, in conclusion, urged the staff of the Sharʿī courts to continue their activity with the same zeal in the frame work of the national jurisdiction.

The defensive tone of Al-Maʾmūn and the absurdity of the position of the chief of an institution, which considers itself the custodian of Muslim traditions, thanking the man who had dealt them the severest blow since the destruction of the Caliphate of Baghdad, are too evident to permit us to take their words at face value, despite *Al-Ahram's* picture showing Al-Tājj shaking hands with ʿAbd al-Nāṣir for the cameras. Their unexpressed feelings are more likely to be like those voiced be the 'ulamā' of Aleppo who, according to *Al-Manār* of October 2nd, 1955, gathered in the great mosque under the presidency of the Mufti of Aleppo and sent protest cables to President ʿAbd al-Nāṣir against the new law which was described as "a blow to Divine law and a wound inflicted on the heart of Islam." In Damascus, the Muslim Brethren distributed pamphlets after the Friday prayers in which ʿAbd al-Nāṣir was attacked as one who had "declared war on Islam." *Al-Raʿy al-ʿĀmm* of September 25th reported that the law had a disastrous effect on the spirit of the Muslims of Syria. Partisans of secularism considered that ʿAbdal-Nāṣir had actually realized secular personal status legislation and all the press reproduced an AFP cable from Cairo describing the measure as "a decisive step in the direction of the kemalization of all institutions in Egypt."

Even a cursory analysis of the explanatory memorandum is enough to show that the fears or hopes of the Syrians, depending on party, were justified.

The memorandum puts an overwhelming emphasis on sovereignty in its most extreme sense. This is the point to which every argument eventually returns. For instance, the authors of the memorandum present a long list of grievances against the communal courts. While most of the deficiencies and inefficiencies mentioned are indeed justified, they do not provide sufficient ground for abolishing the courts altogether. There have been several sound plans of reform, worked out by representatives of the non-Muslim communities in collaboration with

various governments, including the present one. None of these was ever applied because of "certain oppositions"—to use the words of the memorandum. But certainly these "oppositions" were not insuperable to a government which felt strong enough to abolish the courts altogether. One is forced to conclude that, ultimately, it was only on the grounds of sovereignty that these courts were abolished. The memorandum itself points to that conclusion when it asserts that "the government cannot suffer the existence on the national territory of judiciary autonomies which... choose their own way of reform." (cf. Paragraph 6 of the memorandum).

It seems evident, under these circumstances, that the consolation that Shaikh al-Maʾmūn drew from the fact that the religious law would still govern the court decisions in matters of personal status is bound to be short lived. For, besides the awkwardness of a situation in which Muslim qāḍīs would be applying Christian canon law, it cannot fail to strike the observer that when a government cannot tolerate autonomous judicial organizations on the grounds of sovereignty, it is not likely to put up for long with independent legislative authorities, which must be the case if the non-Muslim Egyptians are to be tried according to their own law. Signs of impatience with the legislative autonomies are evident in the memorandum's criticism of the organization of the legal sources and references of the communal courts (cf. par. 5). Sooner or later the government will want to bring the legislative function under its exclusive control, and to do that, it will have to establish a unified law for all. This law cannot be the Muslim law both for obvious political reasons and because the government itself probably is not satisfied with the present laws of personal status, which are the product of past compromises between westernizers and conservatives that left many desirable reforms unrealized. Already in the course of November 1955, barely a month after the promulgation of the new law, the press was inspired to canvass the opinion of religious leaders and legal authorities on the desirability of a civil marriage legislation. It should be mentioned that a similar canvassing of opinion had preceded the abolition of the Sharʿī and the communal courts. Furthermore, the Minister of Justice let it be known after the promulgation of the new law that his Ministry was already preparing the "necessary complements" to the suppression of the autonomous jurisdictions.

But this is hardly the most important aspect of the new law. The truly crucial point is that the government established in the memorandum an explicit opposition between "the rules of public law" concerning sovereignty (par. 1), and the inherited traditions of Egypt which provided for establishment of autonomous Sharʿī and communal courts (par. 2), and then opted for the former against the latter (par. 1, 3, and 6). To be sure, here as elsewhere, the memorandum tried to cloud the issues for the uninformed public, by suggesting that the com-

munal courts were established by the *Hatti Humayun*[4] — a foreign law that had been issued under exceptional circumstances — and by lumping this privilege with the capitulations as "exceptional organizations" (cf. par. 3). Actually, the government must have known that the privilege of communal courts had its roots in the Qurʾān itself (Surah v.43: "Let the people of the Gospel judge according to what God has revealed in the Gospel. They who judge not according to what God has revealed are impious... ". or, Surah v.47: "How will they call upon you to judge them when they have the Gospel and the Torah which contain the judgement of God."), and in a long traditional practice that goes back to the earliest days of Islam; and hence, it must have known too that they were quite separate from the capitulations. At any rate, the fact remains that, for the first time in the history of modern Egypt, the government faced squarely the alternatives between the traditional Sharʿī state and one based on western notions of sovereignty, and chose the latter unequivocally. It does not matter, from the point of view of legal and political theory, that the national courts may still apply a religious law, if they do, because this law will then be applied only by the tolerance and sanction of the sovereign will, in courts established by the sovereign, acting in accordance with a procedure which he wilfully determines (cf. par. 1 and 6), and not by virtue of its being the eternal law of God, immutable and everlasting, binding upon the sovereign and his subjects and applicable to all of mankind. In this respect, *Al-Shaʿb* was correct in stating that ʿAbd al-Nāṣir had actually introduced secular legislation in the last sphere that had remained for Divine law, and in this sense it can be said that the six-century old Sharʿī State in Egypt has come to an end.

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[4] A remarkable instance of trying to confuse the issues is the attempt made in the memorandum (Par. 7) to justify judging a convert to Islam according to Muslim law even if the conversion takes place in the course of the consideration of the case before the courts. The memorandum begs the question when it equates change of nationality with change of religion. Further, it equates two separate acts, such as marriage and divorce with a single act at different stages of consideration before various court levels. Finally, it ignores the question of the obvious discrimination against Christians: granting the premises of the memorandum, why is the same principle not applied to change of denomination within Christianity, or to changes from Christianity to Judaism and vice-versa?

CHARACTER STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY TURKISH ISLAM

Religion is often best studied in terms of personal life. Here are six different expressions of Islam in personal terms as found in Turkey today. They are in part expressions of an abstract theory and in other part the gist of human response to concrete situations. In some senses they represent general types of religious reaction to the common world in which we live. There is ᶜAlī who is in fact the disappointed lover, who has sought another love to replace that by which he felt himself betrayed, though he remains unhappy with the new allegiance. Ahmet Bey is a man of action, one by no means to be despised and not yet all that he aims to be. He is on the way as a vigorous hoja with the world before him. Our third exemplar might be called "the graying man of the new order," living between two worlds, with some pretense to knowledge, for learning is his trade. Part of a very important element, he is under inward orders to carry on a great, good work, and he has learned his role by rote. He is critic and an oracle rather than a thinker.

Our fourth type is a woman, who may be called Ayşe Hanım, who cannot read. Though she has many marks of wisdom, she is not bothered by ethical theory, nor does she appreciate the complicated changes that are occurring around her. She has, nevertheless, a deep and real faith, a faith which makes a difference and into which she draws many things. Fifthly, we have a man who may be styled "the professor," a man with a mission, who has read widely and knows how to integrate the old and the new. He has digested much of European history and is concerned to achieve something great and noble before he dies. Finally there comes a figure who can hardly be called Muslim at all because he has repudiated the recognisably Islamic things and substituted for them the myth of Turkism and the concept of the hero in Atatürk, to which the hero in the Prophet is only dimly related.

Each of these six figures moves in the common world of Turkish religious life and yet in profoundly differing orbits. The youngest and he who, did he survive, would be the oldest, happen to be hojas: the three other men are educators, while the one woman, an illiterate, is merely a devoted mother whose life has been burdened with many personal tragedies. All have found a differing vision in the acceptance of, or their reaction to, the faith of Muḥammad.

THE DISAPPOINTED LOVER

ᶜAlī is deeply religious and has enjoyed a classical education in Islam at the hands of private tutors in Damascus, where his father served as the Sultan's representative prior to the Revolution. His mother knew the Qurᵓān by heart but died when he was young. Raised by his grandparents in Istanbul, he studied law, both Islamic and modern and,

entering government service, fell under the spell of Atatürk. How he became a disappointed lover is hard to discover since he does not talk freely about his personal history. He lived in central Anatolia where his health was affected and that of his wife. While Turkey generally was finding herself after the Revolution by plunging into the emotional depths of blood and soil, ʿAlī moved in the opposite direction. His experience was of the dominance of the concept of 'humanity' above that of any particular nation. Whether actually a member of them or not, he found his religious home in the devotion of the Bektashi dervish order. When he could no longer agree with the policy, he left the government's service, but, not being a radical, he made no active expression of dissent. In his innate conservatism he did not allow his disagreement to provoke him into any violent action, though he is far from being a coward. Conflict is not in his line. No natural leader, he is now retired and a member of a Masonic lodge. By various ways he has come also under the influence of Christ.

His disappointment about Islam is not bitter. It has indeed failed him and his pessimism registers the extent of this failure. But maybe the myth of Atatürk will also fail him. He is a sort of fatalist, though strongly opposed to fatalism, at least as an official philosophy. He seems to live on the brink of the Holy and has great faith in a mystical "fifty years from now" when the world will be better. An Utopian of sorts, he reads spiritualistic philosophies yet does not seek to commune with spirits or to mechanise the power of their hidden strength.

What, then, is his Islam? He no longer believes in it. He has broken out of its shell of faith while retaining a significant Islamic core. What that core is, is hard to define, especially if one demands positive expressions. It is not that he seeks to reform Islam, because he believes there is nothing to reform. "Islam" he seems to say, "is like a jewel lost in seas of mud. But it is not worth the effort to find since the mud is too deep." Such is his response when asked if Islam cannot be remade into a vital spiritual force. His criticisms of Islam are often specific. It is responsible, he believes, for Turkey's plight and the plight of the Arab world. It has acted as the opiate of the people and has captured the spirit of men and caused them to treat women like animals. It has also taken prisoner the aesthetic sense of men and withheld them from the joy of the fine arts. Islam has reduced life to a dead center of numbness. Another criticism bewails Islam's basic legalism. Repeatedly he will affirm that Islam is like the seeds of a fig, thousands and thousands of them and in their multitude quite annoying when you eat the fig. Islamic law, he explains, became so complex that no one could grasp it. It tried to solve every human problem in terms of a legal directive and so became unwieldy and ridiculous.

The criticism as to legalism he stated roundly one day when reading with the writer an orthodox account of Ramaḍān, which observed that the fast was obligatory. In crisp, legal language the work reviewed the

intricate conditions and entered into meticulous detail about seeming infractions etc (e.g. when a fly is inadvertently swallowed.) With a laugh of impatient disdain, ᶜAli dubbed it all a mufti's religion, the construction of lawyers and pundits. His impatience was not mollified when the textbook went on to discourse on whether injections of medicine which remained under the skin and did not enter the stomach were infractions. As recently as 1954 the Head of the Office of Religious Affairs gave a decision that such injections did not incur the penalty of two extra days of fasting. These to him absurd technicalities are a large part of the disappointment of ᶜAli Bey.

But he is also disappointed because, as he believes, Islam has not provided for artistic expression by the soul of man. To him the mosque service is cold and impersonal. "Islamic religion" he complains, "is the expression of insensitive and ignorant men. There is no hand of women, nor of beauty, present in it." In his dour, serious and pessimistic way, he demands that Islam should provide music, "gay" music. His demand is in a sense a reflection of his own dichotomy of soul. Paradoxically he calls for faith and hope, but his mind and spirit express a sense of fate and despair that intellectually he rejects. Angrily he reproaches Islam for its fatalism as he sees it. This is his deepest, intellectual criticism. Islam, he holds, has rendered Muslims lazy and selfish and supine, has delivered them over to be used by others, has clouded their vision of the future. It is on this score that he feels most sorely the betrayal of his spirit by his first love. By its failure he is bereft of the vision of a life of triumph. Islam has kept his people from the forefront of the modern, industrial world. Yet even his pessimism is an expression of how basically Islam has shaped his mind. Though he rejects the pre-determined character of fatalism as an answer to the meaning of life, he has not escaped its overwhelming effect as a point of view which without answering the problems of life at least directs one's attention to the fact that men are caught in their particular context of space and time. One has the impression that if ᶜAlī could digest the theological subtleties he would appreciate Calvin's view of predestination.

In other ways, too, he is tied to Islam. He re-creates the Prophet in the guise of a high man of wisdom. Where he is not critical, he will quote a Quranic text or a tradition in support of his point. Though rejecting the "social form" of his religious faith, he finds it comforting to have the Prophet on his side. He carries his picture in his pocket, along with that of Jesus. His quotations amply reveal his conversance with Islamic history. At these moments his interlocutor has little difficulty in imagining behind his sallies a bearded man of learning from the early days of Islamic lore.

Thus in his individual way, ᶜAlī Bey is Islamic. But what is his religion? The actual expression of it is the Masonic lodge which is the center of his life. He is deeply interested in liberal Christianity

which he thinks will one day become the religion of the world, though he does not feel that he himself need enter into the transformation. At times he will say that we need "the religion of God and men" but if asked precisely what he meant, and if free to reply, he would no doubt agree that his religion, finally, is "mankind." What then is the challenge to the Christian of this disappointed lover in Islam? What do we say to him? How many are there like him in Turkey and in the rest of the world of Islam? What made him what he is? What is to be thought of that fascination he confesses to find in Jesus Christ? What makes it so? Is ʿAlī Bey a man before his time, with his awareness that religions are particular and that as cultures they are disappointing failures, promising "the World" and giving us only a portion of "time."? Must men in this 20th century abandon both Christianity and Islam if they wish to find God?

THE BUSY HOJA

At the time of setting down these thoughts about men and women in their personal Islam today, our young hoja was busy in his mosque delivering legal opinions on his religion. It is Ramaḍān. The mosque has lately been enlarged. Three years in his present office, the hoja is without doubt a success, enjoying a real status in his small community. Two young brothers help him by operating a bookstore close by the mosque. This store is his headquarters when he is not in the mosque, or out in the neighbourhood giving private religious lessons to the children. By these lessons he improves upon the poor pay he receives as an imam from the government and so keeps his family clothed and fed. Trained in a nearly village mosque, he came first to a different city mosque in a poorer quarter, where likewise he spent three years.

With these six years experience as an imam behind him, he is ready and interested to discuss religion. He often enquires about religion and religious freedom in the United States. As might be expected, he is baffled by Christianity, which he thinks is not truly a monotheistic religion. He is sure that his approach to religion is modern and will have none of the charge that imams and religious leaders are reactionary. It is interesting to note the position which he has won in the community he serves. The mosque is attended by young men from all parts of the city. They also frequent the shop from time to time and in buying religious books raise questions of religious faith. Though he admits that there are not many young men like him today, he prides himself on being a hoja to youth. He is even ready to admit that most of the hojas are both old and old-fashioned.

Despite the exception he would claim that he himself constitutes, this admission brings into focus one of the major needs of today's Islam in Turkey, its lack of vigorous leadership. The modernization of Islam must no doubt turn in the end not upon theory but upon leadership. Our young hoja may provide this if he can create a vital religious

spirit among his community. By his zeal and the support of his young men, he might even enlarge the role of the mosque from a place of worship only into the hub of a social life and community expression. What is our Christian obligation to such as he? There is the supreme task of striving to bring to him a fuller understanding of Jesus and the New Testament. Could we also transmit to him something of the concept of 'ministry' within which he might become a sympathetic center for his flock, for their wives and children thus realising the mosque as a place of social life? Instead of being the formal oracle of religious obligation, he might also become a bearer of religious reality in the daily life of the people. The old pattern was to sell charms and dispense magical cures. Could he perhaps substitute the true arts of healing of the mind? These would indeed be hard reforms to effect but the situation is ripe for them.

THE CIVIL SERVANT

This character, the only deceased among our six, lived between the two worlds of Islam in 20th century Turkey. He was born and raised in the days of the Sultan and died in the service of the Republic. He was a deeply religious man whose books display religious interest and who became a director in the Republic's office of Religious Affairs. He served his government faithfully at a time when it was highly suspicious of his faith. To be avowedly religious during the Ataturk Revolution required unusual qualities. The pressures in conflict often made a choice imperative between being true to Islam and being true to the Republic. The people might carry water on both shoulders but a professionally trained religious leader, versed in Islamic law and theology must have found such an *either/or* most disturbing. For fanaticism and passion characterised both sides. Our public servant, however, succeeded in serving two masters. As a Religious Affairs official and director, he was strongly conservative and he proceeded with caution. When religion was either suspect or ignored, he worked patiently and well. He wrote a book, posthumously published, on Islam which came into its own.

Slowly the anti-Islamic attitudes softened and after 1950, the first year of electoral processes and party government, religion began to come again into political favor. The politicians were surprised to find that Islam was alive and that the people wanted open religious expression. With a certain tentativeness the government began to respond to these demands. Textbooks were needed for the Imam ve Hatip Okulları in which young Imams were being educated to replenish the force of religious instruction so sadly depleted since the Revolution. In this context the patience and compromise of our civil servant found their reward. His book was remembered and printed. It filled a need: it was all there was for the moment. Though it presented in traditional fashion the legalistic pattern of familiar Islam, it was from the pen of one of

the government's own servants and on both counts came into its own.

But what of the book? Did it bring Islam to terms with today? Did it succeed in its re-interpretation of Islam? Did it reconcile the religious cosmology of Islam with the scientific cosmology of the 20th century? The answer is: No. The task was not within the author's ability or his intention. His achievement lay rather in his personal fusion of the two pressures. Perhaps the government's debt to its faithful servant is symbolised by the fact that his book now serves as the basis of instruction in religion in the Orta schools, begun in 1957. Its printings have been exhausted. It asserts the adequacy of Islam to the modern age and insists that Islam is basically the 'natural' religion. Since modern science likewise concerns the facts of nature, there is no conflict between Islam and science. But nowhere does he face the new social forms, nor the implications of historical sciences. One may be pardoned for wondering whether he ever truly realised what was happening all the time he served the Republic. He and his book represent an adaptation of Islam but one that is not yet sufficiently abreast of its intellectual responsibility to its own claims. Before turning to an examination of our 'professor's efforts in discharge of this task, let us contemplate the meaning and temper of Ayşe Hanım.

A WOMAN OF FAITH

Our fourth prototype is neither intellectual nor professionally religious. Yet she is infinitely significant. For does not the future of Islam rest upon its meaning and power, in molding the lives of ordinary, common people? Our woman of faith is a very ordinary Turk, typical of so many who have passed the fifty mark in their lives. She had no formal education. Her 85 year-old mother still lives in the nearby village, cared for by her three sons. Ayşe can neither read nor write, but she can "read" or quote the Qurʾān and often does so. It is in fact her deep religion which has held her together. Her husband is a drunkard who squandered the inheritance left to him by an over doting father. He must now be supported and works little. He picks a few olives during the olive season and does odd jobs from time to time. But he does his best "work" in the coffee house or under the stimulus of a bottle of raki.

Ayşe has other personal tragedies. Her son was drowned just when he was blossoming into manhood. Few western mothers can realize all that a son means to a Turkish mother, bringing her favor in the eyes of her husband and a sense of self-fulfilment to a degree impossible in any other way. (In pre-Republic times a wife who bore no son might well be divorced as a failure). A Turkish boy of even kindergarten age will command a respect from his mother seldom found even among utterly doting western mothers. He is actually her master. Ayşe has never recovered from the loss of her son. But she has been able to sustain herself through it. Though she mourns him almost inces-

santly, she has placed the meaning of it all in the hands of Allah and her mourning has almost been turned into acts of religious devotion. She is a serious Muslim, keeping the formal rituals, doing the namāz, following the Qur'ān on the radio and fasting one day a week as an extra token of devotion. Thereby she hopes also to solve another problem that has added to her living burden — to find another husband for her widowed daughter whose first husband was taken away by disease several years ago. Her daughter's son carries the name of her own departed child. But she wants her daughter to find the ultimate triumph of further sons through another marriage, that the meaning of her life may be restored.

Ayşe's piety is characterised by interesting elements of folk religion outside the validities of orthodoxy. For example she considers one of the Islamic holidays in terms of a far more ancient fertility cult whose origins go back far into the mists of Anatolia. During the festival, which occurs in spring, boys jump over bonfires and girls wade in the waters of the sea. Green plants are cut, cooked and eaten in the supposition that they conduce in some way to fertility. Our heroine regards this holiday with the uncritical belief that belongs to all acts of folk religion. Perhaps then she is the deepest reaching example of personal meaning in Turkish religion. She is a true woman of faith, in that strength of personality has come out of the depth of religious conviction. Islam has given her security and support to her life in adversities. She thus becomes an indirect testimony to real religious insights and potentialities in the faith that has made her what she is. She is, in her way, a sample of the power of Islamic "fatalism" to make personalities, in a fashion, triumphant. For though fatalism may produce ignorance and apathy, it can also develop courageous living. In our communication with Islam must we not gain a new insight into the personal and ontological value of Islam's confidence in the providence of God? Does not Ayşe Hanım give us reason to search out the religious significance of "Fate"? Is an unchecked humanism a right alternative or preferable to the risk of ignorance and sloth under the dominance of an unquestioned providence?

THE FAITHFUL PROFESSOR

His life work has been to bring the faith of Islam into meaningful relation to the new social and intellectual concepts of the day. Though retired in Ankara now, he is still active writing for magazines, where he adumbrates his ambitious plans for a revival of Turkish Islam. Sometimes, like Hegel, he appears to be taking on the whole cosmos. Humility is not his forte. He wants as the clue to all else, to Turkify Islam. This could be broached through the calling of a Committee of the highest scholars and leaders, who, being free from political entanglements, would constitute a 20th century Turkish *Ijtihād.* They would re-explore the bases of Islamic faith in order to develop a new pattern of its expression. The latter shall be only by Turks and for

Turks. He seems to assume that each national unit in the Islamic world must be left to put its own house in order.

The project envisaged would take many years and would need to begin with a proper translation of the Qur'ān into Turkish. This indeed has been the center of the professor's life work. He has been working for twelve years on such a translation: it is about to be published. As the keystone of his reforming crusade, the translation has a characteristically professorial *raison d'être*. The argument is that holy books have asserted their influence only when they have appeared in the native language of the people (Cf Luther's German Bible and the King James version in English). The Qur'ān in worthy Turkish will be the making of the Turkish language.

Having served on the government's language commission in the thirties, he reasons as follows: Modern, European nations integrated their nationalism and their religious ethos, by means of "Scripture" translations, which produced both a standardisation of language and a vivid and effective form of religious expression molding the mind and culture of the people. National literature emerges: the religious spirit, transfused through culture by language, produces high art, and with the development of these factors comes in turn a dynamic national spirit and industrial progress.

Such a sequence of evolution has been lacking in Turkey because the mysteries of positive sociology have not been understood. For lack of the insights of Durkheim (that national spirit is vitalised through religious expression) a century and a half of Turkish modernisation have remained basically unsuccessful. His assurance about the remedy in Quranic translation is such that one can almost see the factories rising in the mind's eye upon the horizon. Our professor wishes to go back beyond the pattern of the four orthodox schools of law in their reception of the Qur'ān, a pattern which he holds was dictated by the external circumstances of early Islam. He wishes to re-establish Quranic implications on new bases of interpretation. He aims to do this through appealing to the philosophy of the Qur'ān. The definition of the latter demands the devoted and disciplined labors of true modern "doctors" of the faith. It is not a task fit for mere journalists, or education departments or Directorates of Religious Affairs, or even the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara.

It is interesting, in passing, to note that our professor evidently sees in western civilisation more than material power and scientific genius, even if, in his analysis of the cultural role of national language in religious life, he has greatly over-simplified the intricate factors shaping modern Europe. Also of deep interest is his apparent recognition of the idea that religions are subject to common laws and have corresponding roles in the life of their respective societies. In this he is doubtless in debt to Durkheim's Turkish poularizer and exponent Zia Gökalp. Our professor refers to Christianity and Islam as if they were

in effect the same thing. He thinks of them as social cement, as forces bringing a society into self-consciousness. It is assumed that since Christianity brought the national life of certain European nations to maturity through Biblical translation in the vernacular, Islam will likewise revive Turkey through a Turkish Qurʾān. Are Scriptures, then, simply sources of religio-national vigor? Is there no difference in their inward content? And what of the whole problem of the historical disparities and divergencies between the two situations and the two centuries?

At any rate, our professor is trying to reconcile Muḥammad and Atatürk in a far more articulate way than our faithful civil servant. He would harness faith in God to sustain the worldly meaning of faith in the nation. The Prophet and the Father of the nation he sees as reciprocal and mutually enchancing figures. He thus calls in question the whole dimension and role of religion in the life of man and society. If the professor's committee of *Ijtihād* takes its duties seriously, it will have to face the whole question of religion as more than a mere function of sociology. Christian communication with him must surely concentrate on this area of his ideology and quest. Maybe the whole issue can open up the absolute significance and comparison of Prophecy. Intellectually speaking there is surely thrilling work ahead in the interfaith examination of the whole incidence of the prophetic as understood and received in Judaism, Christianity and Islam and as called in question, on the absolute side, by this eager, and perhaps naïve, sociological approach. As custodians of particular faith, with unique claims, are we not put on our mettle by a philosophy which denies unique knowledge through particular revelation? The Christian response to the professor must be one of deep seriousness and respect.

THE SECULAR THEOLOGIAN

No all religious expression in Turkey, however, is Islamic. Our final figure here represents another element in the total picture. The grounds of what we are paradoxically calling "secular theology" prominent in Turkey since the Revolution, can be studied in the sixth "Muslim" of our acquaintance. In a recent book, *Dinde Bir Reform* he interprets a religious development which he believes has actually occurred already in Turkey. The new religion is not Islam, it is Kemalism, the apotheosis of that power of Atatürk which impregnates every aspect of Turkish life. The name of Atatürk is not just an honorific title: it has an almost religious mystique. Our author then proposes to make articulate the religion which he believes is actually operative in contemporary Turkey, based on that charisma of Atatürk which over the years has been slowly informing the minds and loyalties of the Turkish people. He has given the phenomenon a self-conscious religious dimension and proclaimed it the new religion of Turkey, crystallizing into dogma an influence that is near the heart of Turkey's efforts after

articulate modern nationhood. In the theological structure of Kemalism, he expounds in his own way the charismatic meanings of Muḥammad and Atatürk.

His claim is that religions are merely the expression of the social consciousness of peoples. A race mysticism is seen as part of all nationalism. Religion and nation being the same, the test of the former is its success in lending fulfilment to the latter. Islam, he alleges, has hampered, not fulfilled, the Turkish nation, because of its Arab character and its ancient mentality. He criticises the Qurʾān on the ground that its revelations were often subject to the human desires of the Prophet, thus provoking violent reactions from Islamic Turkish apologists. He reciprocates by sharp attacks on the hoja mentality which, he asserts, profits by the ignorance it perpetuates. He sees in hojas only selfish and lustful motives and pillories their exploitation of the sick and gullible in excessive terms.

Yet his attacks are to be seen as part of his religious apologetic. It is a "faith" be claims to be defending, in the name of such things as women's rights and mental freedom. On the positive side, he puts forward a strange concept of prophecy as leadership. Religions being tested by their pragmatic results in the "health" of peoples, prophets must be assessed in terms of the leaders they constitute or evoke. Prophets are the great men who disclose to lesser men the shape of group greatness and lead their lesser fellows to it. Those men traditional religions call prophets are in effect heroes or supermen and among them he would rank not only the strictly religious prophets, but philosophers, artists, scientists and leaders of various kinds. Atatürk is the new prophet for Turkey, whose is the charisma that will lead Turks into a deeper and greater expression of life. In some sense Al-Fātiḥah, the opening Quranic Surah, must be interpreted in terms of Atatürk. He invokes the sense of a 'real presence' of Atatürk in the national life as the cult which dominates Turkish life and thought. He theorises on, or gives religious character to, the undoubted mystique of Atatürk which exists in Turkey today. Being himself a Lise school teacher and representative of many such in several cities, he has brought out into dogmatic form the spirit which finds partial expression in Turkish school textbooks and is even hidden in the *Din Dersleri* lessons.

Herein lies something of that dichotomy of mind which underlay the re-introduction of religious teaching in the schools. Can two masters be served — the properly Islamic and the Turkifying philosophy of our secular theologian? What of the valid Christian relationship to this whole phenomenon? The appearance of the secular theology in such confident and articulate terms means a sharpened and intensified Christian obligation. It gives dramatic point to the central problem confronting all faith in particular and unique revelation. There are obvious parallels between this situation and that which confronted Christian theology in the West in the middle 19th century and since,

with the added complication of a Christian mediation of meaning across the formidable barriers of inter-faith divergence. The phenomenon in one sense invites the revelatory faiths to a common ground; yet by the same token sharpens and intensifies both their internal relationships and their external tasks. It would be idle here to speculate how Islam in Turkish hands will respond to the permeation of its ethos with the influence of Kemalism or how our young hoja or our faithful professor will take the measure of their secular contemporaries, or yet how the faith of Ayşe Hanım and her kin of soul will react to the pressures of the educated life withheld from her. Our six character studies are no more than personal sketches of the human incidence of vast and perennial problems of mind, of worship and of creed.

Tarsus, Turkey JOHN A. T. KINGSBURY

"THE CALL OF THE MINARET" — A REVIEW.

"The Call of the Minaret" is avowedly written as a study of Islam for Christians and from a Christian point of view. But it certainly calls for Muslim review since it may be regarded as a sort of open letter to Muslims also and being published by the Oxford University Press, New York, is in no sense a "secret document" intended only for particular readers. The intention of this (Muslim) reviewer is to respond to it in the same spirit of non-polemic on which the book itself proceeds.

The growth of the sciences of history and sociology, which in their empirical attitudes are no different from any other sciences, has taught the westerner — at least the enlightened one — to recognise the essential value of all religion as an institution within human society. The study of comparative religions, as a part of the science of sociology is rendering the westerner, and the Christian, less intolerant. This tolerance, not least in its Muslim directions, doubtless owes much to political changes in the world — a fact which is frankly recognised on the dust cover of "The Call of the Minaret" where it is remarked that "in the political arena the West and Communism compete for the favor of emergent Muslim nations."

The book contains little on the theme of the superiority of Christianity over Islam. Indeed this idea is hardly even implicit in a single sentence of the work. It is, however, evident that the author is writing as a devoted Christian and that he seeks to offer a manual for the Christian missionary expression of the Church today. His accent becomes at times passionate, notably in Part III on: "Minaret and Christian" and in Chapter ix of that Part: "The Call to Retrieval." Yet without restrained emotion and true passion, no religious work can be written. The restraint which characterises this work makes it an eminent representative of literature dealing with inter-religious relationships.

In Part II, dealing with "Minaret and Muslim" the author is successful in avoiding pronouncements of approval or disapproval on this or that aspect of Islam. He presents to his readers the premises of Islam itself, saying: "Come, see for yourselves." Thus, in both content and spirit, the work calls for a Muslim response; for a considered reciprocation of its attitudes and its frankness, not for a sharp retort or a crude disavowal. There must be no mincing of academic criticism where it may prove necessary, but it should be academic and not merely assertive.

By "the call" of the minaret the author signifies, of course the Ādhān or call of the muezzin. He takes the Ādhān as the key formula around which the significance and meaning of Islam can be studied and comprehensively discussed. For the Ādhān embodies that to which Islam summons both Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The author is

right surely in assuming that the understanding of the Ādhān is a door to the intimate knowledge of Islam. Hence the division of Chapters in the book follows the sequence of ideas in the Ādhān. To be objective here is the author's concern. He is not offering a methodology of debate with the Muslim: he is introducing the non-Muslim to the meaning of Islam as apprehended by its devotees.

Written in eminently eloquent English, every page of "The Call of the Minaret" holds statements and ideas in response to which the alert Muslim could write volumes. Here our concentration, for reasons of space, must be on those observations and ideas which most evoke Muslim difference or appreciation.

First there is the Prophet's conception of God concerning which the book remarks: "Muḥammad proclaimed God to them (the Meccans) in a sequence of descriptives which have been called on Quranic grounds, the Beautiful Names, *al Asmā' al Ḥusnā*. These number ninety nine though the collections are not always identical. Most of them are found in the Qur'ān itself, the remainder being traditional." (p. 40) Professor Cragg is no exception in referring to the ninety nine Beautiful Names as truly representing the Prophet's conception of God. In fact in this matter the western scholar does what Muslims themselves have been doing for centuries.

In a doctoral thesis entitled: "Studies in the Ethical Doctrine of the Qur'ān" approved with enthusiasm by Cambridge University in May, 1953, the present reviewer made and classified exhaustive collections of the Quranic contexts in which some at least of the ninety nine Names figured and thus demonstrated that nothing could have misrepresented the Quranic conception of God more than the arbitrary listing of the so-called Beautiful Names. For these have specific significance within their Quranic contexts and divorced from the latter they lose their meaning and precision and become a mere jumble or catalogue shorn of exact significance and thus seriously misleading to the unwary.

Certainly the ninety nine Names have a great significance for Islam and must be mentioned in any account of the way in which *average Muslims* have understood and known God through many centuries *since the Prophet's death*. But to say that the Prophet himself proclaimed God in a sequence of these descriptives is not authentic historically.

According to "The Call of the Minaret" the revelation received by Muḥammad "is conceived of, not as a communication of the Divine Being, but only of the Divine Will. It is a revelation, that is, of law not of personality. God the revealer remains Himself unrevealed... Revelation is not a personal disclosure of the Divine. It is for this reason apart from its fear of compromising unity that the Qur'ān does not use the term 'Father' of God nor 'son' of the believer. It allows only 'Rabb' and 'abd." (p. 47).

In this passage the author touches one of the most fundamental differences between Muslims and Christians in their ideas of God. But while speaking of Quranic revelation he says that "it is a revelation ... of law not of personality", and that in it "God the revealer remains Himself unrevealed," he seems to be involved in an overstatement of his case. If he had said that, comparatively speaking, the Christian revelation concentrates more on revelation of Divine Personality than of Divine law, he would be more readily acceptable. Again, it would be nearer objectivity if it were said that Muslim theology — and consequently popular Muslim belief — know and accept the Qurʾān more as a revelation of Divine law than of Divine Personality.

A direct perusal of the Qurʾān will impress upon the reader that Divine Personality is revealed there in great fullness, though the theological drive towards Divine transcendance in Islam has obscured the knowledge of that Personality there revealed. Nothing scared Muslim believers more than the danger of a return to idol worship in early Islam. Muslim theology from the start, therefore, undertook to formulate a conception of God that would entertain not the slightest resemblance of God to anything human. This was carried to an extreme and Greek philosophy soon provided the essence and the attributes terminology, whereby God was understood as absolute, the very essence of incomprehensibility. Very soundly Dr. Cragg remarks: "Entire transcendance is in the end a blank agnosticism." (p. 317).

Where literalistic reaction did find expression in exegesis it was blind-alleyed by the *bila kayf* formula to which Dr. Cragg refers with insight elsewhere (p. 55.) This meant that God has attributes, like sitting, striking, mocking, but in an absolutely non-human sense, which was by its nature incomprehensible. Thus the concept of God was left completely devoid of the element of intimacy with and challenge to human affairs.

Theologically conceived in this way, this transcendant Deity withdrawn into *tanzīh* (abstraction) has indeed no personality. But we should be clear that it is the Muslim theologian and not the Qurʾān who is responsible for this situation and for the resultant impression gained by the outsider that in Islam God is not revealed.

If the Qurʾān is read without the habitual spectacles of the theologians, it does reveal God's Personality. We are still urgently awaiting, both from orientalists and from Muslim scholars, that disentangling of the meanings of the Qurʾān from theological interpretation which will demonstrate the truth of this claim. That there is a real difference, however, between the Christian and the Muslim understanding of revelation is no doubt the admitted fact upon which the author wished to focus attention in the passage quoted above. The statement that the Quranic revelation has to do only with law and not with the Personality of God vaguely relates to that difference but fails to do it justice or

to give it clarity. The real distinction needing rather to be brought out is that in the Muslim scheme of beliefs there is no idea corresponding to the Christian concept of "the Gospel of God in Christ."

The Muslim theological idea of an incomprehensible, absolute God, the Essence, Who is under no necessity, brought in its train the notion of the inscrutability of the Divine Will. This is a fact which Dr. Cragg grasps soundly (cf. p. 53). He concludes: "This was the measure both of the price they were ready to pay for the idea of Unity and of the way they understood it." May we suggest, however, the following modification of this sentence: "This was the price they were ready to pay for the idea of God's unity (meaning His uniqueness) as they understood it." For the idea of God's Unity does not categorically demand the kind of sacrifice made in its name by Muslim theology. It was a sacrifice involved by their way of understanding that Unity.

Iqbāl has brilliantly diagnosed the confusion of the issue on the part of the theologians when he remarks: "The real contrary of *Tauḥīd* (belief in unity) is not a belief in *Kathrah* (plurality of Divine faculties) Its real contrary is *Shirk* (belief in partners of God.)"

In the Chapter on "The Islamic Order for Human Society" we find the observation that "rational ethics or political science or economic theory — as the product of human logic, argumentation, dialectic or pondered experience — do not theoretically exist in Islam. The basis of human conduct and organisation is revelation." (p. 143) If this statement were made with the words "among Muslims" instead of "in Islam" it would be nearer to the truth. These sciences were discussed in a certain way by Muslim thinkers though it is true that rational knowledge (as often in mediaeval Christian thought) was mainly expected to find ways of conformity with revelation (though in actuality revelation was not infrequently interpreted so as to conform to empirical knowledge rather than the reverse.)

It is profoundly true that in modern times rational ethics, political science, economics, as the product of human logic, have developed to an unprecendented degree in the western world and that nothing like the modern forms of these sciences existed in the heydey of the Muslim peoples. That fact, however, need not depress Muslims. For what is later in the movement of history enjoys the benefit of accumulation, even if the achievements of the modern west cannot be explained merely in terms of such accumulation. But it is not valid to suggest that such achievements owe any categorical debt, as intellectual disciplines, to Christianity in a way that they could not also to Islam. For this would be to argue, surely misleadingly, that Christianity as a religion engenders by its nature the spirit of science and that Islam by its nature does not.

There can be no disagreement with the statement that in the present age Christian peoples (not Christianity qua religion) have made

infinitely greater achievements in rational sciences, free of revelatory basis, than have contemporary Muslim peoples. But a very subtle dialectic will have to be devised to claim that they are the particular achievements of the Christian religion, the more so in that independence of theological dogmatism and dominance would seem to have been a condition of the scientific achievement. For fairness let it be added that the attainments of ʿUmar al Khayyām and of Tūṣī in the realm of mathematics, of Idrīsī and Yāqūt in geography, of Ibn Sīnā in medicine and of Ibn Khaldūn in historiography, in their superlative quality, ought also to be ascribed to Muslim peoples, as such, and not to Islam qua religion.

Unless the foregoing paragraphs have mistaken the tenour of Dr. Cragg's observations at this point, it may be conjectured that he suggests some incompatibility between Islam and rational science. All that he or we can rightly say is that nothing like the complex and highly developed rational sciences of the modern west have been achieved by modern Muslims. The same remark would apply to contemporary Buddhism without any proper implications as to a Buddhist incapacity for science inherent in its being Buddhism.

Modern, university-educated Muslims are well aware of the autonomy of the empirical sciences and their independence of revelatory criteria. Where these sciences are taught in Muslim countries there may be a certain disturbance at the apparent discord between science and revelation and since such education makes rather for sound training in the sciences than in the most elementary disciplines of religious knowledge, there is doubtless a far greater respect for the former. The Muslim sense of the autonomy of science has yet to find healthy expression or refined definition, but it exists as a feeling. A modern and satisfying exegesis of the Qurʾān, with a scientific insight into revelation like that of the rich modern exegesis of the Bible, has yet to appear.

Much more refreshing for a Muslim is Part III of "The Call of the Minaret" in which the author undertakes to explain the duties to which the minaret summons the Christian. Chapter X on "The Call to Interpretation," setting forth how Christianity is to be articulated among Muslims, deserves to be translated into the major Muslim languages and given the widest circulation. It it an earnest piece of writing. As a Christian conversant with the scientific heritage of the west and with Muslim peoples and their literature, the author invites his fellow Christians, with admirable restraint and beautiful passion, to ponder and surmount the presuppositions which cause the Muslim to fail to see, as from within, the meaning of Christianity.

With justification he deplores the ignorance among Muslims about what Christianity is and means. (pp. 246-247). How impatient the Christian scholar could feel when a Muslim scholar talks polemically without a knowledge of the elements of Christianity, just as a similar

ignorance about Islam on the part of Christians vexes the Muslim. But the position is one of unbalance. Christians have studied Islam with more depth than might have been expected from any non-Muslim community. Muslims often remark that such study is perverted, hostile and wrongly motivated. But at least it is study and if it is "motivated" do we not have among Muslims, as a kind of counterpart, a "motivated" ignorance of Christianity?

Chairs in Islamic learning have existed in Universities of the Christian world for centuries. Scholars of various Christian countries have rendered immeasurable service to Muslim learning, with their innumerable editions of the classics of Islamic lore, sometimes of massive proportions. They have collected great libraries of Muslim literature and catalogued them most methodically. Apart from thus preserving this literature and making it accessible to scholars everywhere, they have spent hundreds of lifetimes in writing systematic grammars and lexicons of Islamic languages, in producing commentaries on our classics in modern languages and in the translation of those classics. The Leiden Encyclopedia is but one exemplary achievement. Despite suspicion of motives behind some at least of the contributions in this Encyclopedia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan have undertaken, under state sponsorship, to translate it into Turkish, Arabic and Urdu respectively. For we are certain that we do not possess teams of Islamic scholars able to produce an original encyclopedia of the same quality, nor shall possess for years and years to come.

Can any Muslim scholar in the whole Islamic world claim with conviction that he knows more about Christianity than the average Christian Islamicist in a western university knows about Islam? Do not we Muslims rather talk about Christianity from ignorance than from adequate knowledge? Here it could be wished that "The Call of the Minaret," in referring to Muslim ignorance of Christianity, had spoken also of Muslim ignorance of Islam itself. (The writer of this article with shame includes himself). If Muslims resent this remark and say they have every reason to be satisfied with their actual knowledge of Islam, this can only mean that the state of affairs is even more distressing. We must know that we do not know our past sufficiently and have little sense of perspective about it—the kind of perspective that can only come with abundance of historical detail.

Christianity is the faith of one third of the world's population. Has not a study of Christian society a commensurate claim in our study of the world in which we live? This may sound platitudinous but it is sadly and widely unrealised in the world of Muslims. Our Muslim study of Christianity in the present age should be sympathetic, even reverential. The Muslim belief that Christianity as a system corrupted the true, original message of Jesus which was identical with that of the Prophet of Islam is an empty one if held without knowledge or

concern for Who Jesus was and what heritage He left. In true academic spirit, Muslim scholarship must admit and allow the urge to study the Bible as the greatest source of knowledge about Jesus. If, in Muslim belief, the real Bible was lost while the existing Book is a distortion, this belief should be given substance in objective evidence.

Seen in this setting, it may well surprise Muslim scholarship to know that the finest Christian scholarship is infinitely better aware than Muslims are of the historical development of the Bible and the story of its text through the ages. They have studied the relation between the incidence of revelation and its record with more care and persistence than Muslims have brought to the problem of the order of the verses of the Qurʾān in the *Tanzīl*. Whereas we dismiss the existing Bible as false, the Christian sees it under an entirely different concept of the nature of revelation. Neither party can readily persuade the other by rational argument that their view of what revelation is, is finally true. The best course for each is an openness of mind to how the other conceives and receives the revelation he believes in. Whatever be the truth about its history, the Bible is the most sacred document relating to the person of Jesus, whose place in Muslim people is high among the Prophets. The richness of the Biblical fervour can be felt even by the casual reader. We must learn as Muslims to read and study it with reverence, thus setting an example for the Christian reader of the Qurʾān. This is the call of an international age. It is the summons of the Church bell for the Muslim, even as in this volume under discussion we have the minaret's call to the Christian. Mutual respect must develop through mutual knowledge. The Christian continues to work hard for that knowledge: has the Muslim seriously begun? Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's incomplete Commentary on the Bible is the one and only Muslim work of its nature, while Christian works on the Qurʾān run into hundreds. It ended in 1862.

True justice to the chapter "The Call to Interpretation" will be done if it is set as the basis of a three months' seminar with Christian and Muslim scholars sitting together on it. It is a passionate effort to undo those preconditions of the uninformed Muslim mentality that lead to a casual dismissal of the meanings of the Christian Faith for a Christian as "wrong." Muslims who have, in recent times, widely protested against the Christian misunderstanding of Islam, must lend ear to what is said in this book about the Muslim misunderstanding of Christianity.

No easy paraphrase of the chapter in question will put its meanings across to the Muslim. The Christian scholar and believer have more than a century of the historical method of studying Christianity behind them. They are used to studying within the Bible as well as its exegesis *historically*. Biblical Encyclopedias in particular have trained the minds so, for there each word of the Bible got its history registered. Not only that. The Western mind is familiar with the historical treat-

ment of words even in lexicons as a matter of course. In Muslim linguistics this was introduced on a somewhat comparable scale by Lane in his great Arabic-English Lexicon.

The Muslim mind generally, for want of this training in historical method, fails to see the meaning of revelation as understood by Christians. Muslims of moderate education in our country even today understand the *nuzūl* of the Qurʾān in the sense of the Prophet's receiving the Qurʿān from the physical-above literally as a bound volume. This is not the slightest exaggeration of their way of understanding. The author of this review ventured to talk to very intelligent and accomplished graduates on the subject, and when they were told to the contrary that the Qurʾān was a collection of intermittent revelations that were proclaimed by the Prophet orally, they became extremely surprised and even shocked. The most authentic fact that the present arrangement of the Qurʾān is different from the actual order of revelation, which was one of the most primary subjects of discussion in Quranic learning in the classical days of Islam is unknown to a very great majority of enlightened Muslims today. The writer of this review, when he was leading a Seminar Course in the field of Tafsīr, at the McGill Institute of Islamic Studies, initiated the Muslim participants in that group into a study of Al Suyūṭī's *Asbāb al-Nuzūl,* and Al Suyūṭī's discussion of the *awwal* and *ākhir* of Quranic revelation, and the actual order of revelation. They admitted that this acquaintance with Al Suyūṭī's discussions "shook their faith." Some of these Muslim scholars from Egypt, India, Syria, and Pakistan, were holders of Masters' degrees from their countries, in Islamic subjects.

It is the historical study of the Qurʾān, and a scientific review of the classical discussions of *Asbāb al-Nuzūl* and *Tartīb al-Nuzūl,* which will reorientate the Muslim mind and enable him to share scientific attitudes with the Westerner.

Only then will the Muslim mind develop understanding of the Christian conception of revelation. The kind of knowledge which will make him recognise the significance of the span of some twenty three years of the Qurʾān's *nuzūl,* and their history and their relation to Quranic revelation, will make him understand that the eternal Word of God, in the process of being revealed, is spread in time. In the case of the Qurʾān it spread over twenty-three years. In the case of the Bible it was spread over more than a millennium.

"On the Muslim view of revelation" remarks Prof. Cragg, "all prophets are bearers of words from God, understood to be entrusted to them in complete form, not as a result of Divine enabling of their mental and spiritual powers, but as a verbal transmission from heaven." This remark is generally true, though attention may here be drawn to the extremely fascinating discourse on the nature of Quranic *waḥy* in the *Tafsīr* of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, which stands distinct

from the popular mechanical Muslim view of *Waḥy* not preceded by Divine enabling of the Prophet's mind and spirit.

Sir Sayyid made modifications in the over-mechanical view of *waḥy* by widening the denotation of the term, arguing on the basis of the Qurʾān itself, that *waḥy* is shared on levels low and high, by all living beings. He quotes the verse:

وَأَوْحَى رَبُّكَ إِلَى النَّحْلِ أَنِ اتَّخِذِي مِنَ الْجِبَالِ بُيُوتًا وَمِنَ الشَّجَرِ وَ مِمَّا يَعْرِشُونَ ثُمَّ كُلِي مِنْ كُلِّ الثَّمَرَاتِ....

And thy Lord inspired the bee, "Take to house in the mountains, and in the trees, and in the hives they build. Then eat from every fruit..." (xvi.70-71).

His modification does not draw support from historical approach. To the sundry profound observations made by Prof. Cragg relating to the comparison between the Muslim and Christian faiths, it would be an appropriate addition to compare the roles of Christ and Muḥammad as vehicles of revelation in the respective views of their followers. To the Christian, Christ's life itself is revelation of God to men (not to Christ). Therefore that revelation commences with the very birth of Christ. In the case of the Prophet of Islam, his role as *Receiver of Revelation,* which he was to proclaim to men, began when he was forty. What was the status of the Prophet before he received the Sūrat al-ʿAlaq? Was he not a Prophet before that? We must say he was, though the Prophet himself was not conscious of this before this first revelation came at his age of forty. Since according to the Qurʾān itself, the entire life of the Prophet is the *Uswa-i-ḥasana* (the commended model), the forty years of his life prior to his becoming conscious of his assignment as Prophet and Receiver of Revelation, must be taken as in perfect harmony with the conduct of life enjoined by the Qurʾān. The Prophet's mental and spiritual faculties were equipped by Divine orientation to receive the ideas of the Qurʾān as true. Again, even after the first forty years of his life, the deed and non-revelatory speech of the Prophet (the Sunna and the Ḥadīth) were perfectly harmonious with the spirit of the Qurʾān. Thus the belief in the Divine enabling of the Prophet's mind as a pre-requisite (not the cause) of his receiving revelation follows from the *historical approach* as a logical necessity.

In the final analysis, the test of the truth and genuineness of the Bible as revelation (from a non-partial angle) is that it has captured the minds of billions of human beings—the number of good and well-meaning servants of God and humanity among them is great—for several centuries, and still does so. The same is the test of the truth of Quranic revelation.

In this very chapter "The Call to Interpretation," the author treats the most important difference between the Christian and Muslim dog-

mas, that of Divine Trinity and Divine Unity. (pp. 305-317). He says:

> "Reflection makes it clear that the idea of Divine Unity cannot be enforced in a mathematical sence, and that enforcement in such sense is the ground of most Muslim antipathy to the Christian Trinity. The higher we proceed in the scale of being the more rich and varied are the unities we encounter. Mathematical units are low in the scale of values, such as stones or a unicellular organism. The bricklayer on a straight wall may lay any brick that comes to hand because they are all alike and interchangeable. They are mere units. Not so the parts of a human body or the components of a flower. Here we have larger unities with differentiated parts. Human personalities are the richest and most diversified unities within our experience. William Shakespeare or Abraham Lincoln were single persons but what wealth of diversity lay within them. If the order of ascending unity reveals increasing fullness, who shall say that the Unity of God is not the richest and the greatest of all? Certainly we cannot disallow the doctrine of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit on the ground that these add upto three. Was not Muhammad Prophet, husband, leader and example? He was no less one Muhammad. On whatever other grounds Muslims feel disposed to disagree with the Christian understanding of God, it cannot validly be on the ground that it is not a doctrine of Unity. For the only sense in which it can be thought not to be so is the one completely inappropriate, namely the mathematical." (pp. 316-317).

What is meant in the above passage by "mathematical unity"? This is not defined above, though the concrete example of a brick is given, with reference to its interchangeability with other bricks. The use of this term together with the example seems not too clear. The logical opposite of interchangeability is uniqueness. But the conditions that make anything unique are not necessarily the richness of diversity of its attributes. The Mount Everest is unique by virtue of a single attribute, its unmatched height.

Diversity of attributes or non-plurality of attributes, it seems, has nothing to do with the essential nature of *oneness*. The Christian conception of the Unity of God, as Prof. Cragg so justifiably and passionately argues, is certainly compatible with the Trinity, and the Trinity does make a Unity.

But we do hope that it is not implied by the author through contrast that the Quranic Unity of God is a mathematical unity when compared with the Christian Unity in Trinity. The Oneness of God made known in the Qurʾān is not a mathematical oneness in the sense that He is interchangeable, nor is it a simple oneness in the sense that He has no richness of Attributes. If Muḥammad was Prophet, husband, leader and example, is not God in Muslim belief the Creator, the Sustainer, the Ruler and the Judge?

The implication does not seem to be intended by the author, but can be suggested by the use of the term "mathematical unity" and the example of a brick. One might say that all unities are mathematical, since 'One', the number is involved. We might speak of a simple mathematical unity like a penny, and speak of a complex mathematical unity like the budget of the U.S.A. Both are unities. May we not dismiss

the word *mathematical*, and speak only of simple and complex unities, not of mathematical and non-mathematical unities?

Thus considered, the Unity of God taught by the Qur'ān is no simpler a unity than the Unity of God conceived by Christianity, though the nature of the 'complexity' of Unity differs in the respective conceptions.

In Muslim Theology the confusion of the issue of Unity was that the theologians got preoccupied by efforts to safeguard the belief in *Waḥdah* of God against the belief in plurality of His Attributes (*Kathrah*). The real call of the Qur'ān was to safeguarding the belief in God's Oneness against belief in plurality of gods, (*shirk*), or the belief in partners of God. Prof. Cragg's remarks quoted seem to have been influenced by this phase of Muslim Theology.

In the chapter "The Call to Retrieval," the author calls upon the Christian to retrieve what Christianity has lost by the rise of Islam, "which has proved in history the supreme displacer of the faith of Christ." (p. 244). He admits that "if Christianity did not persist in more robust quality the fault was not wholly with Islam." (p. 256). He also conjectures that "perhaps in the formative years of Muḥammad's quest a more virile, a less dubious, Christianity could have satisfied his sense of need and obviated the great "other" that Islam became." (p. 264). The semanticist will say that the line of thought in this last quotation at best expresses a wish, and no more.

Certainly Islam succeeded partly because the Christianity of those times was not virile and was dubious, but the absence of this one factor cannot be counted upon to have obviated the need of a distinct, meaningful and virile faith as Islam.

And now a word about the subject of conversion itself. Every reasonable citizen of the world will agree with Sir Zafrullāh Khān's recognition of the right of all religions to peaceful self-propagation within a Muslim state. (quoted p. 339). For the Muslim population of the world today we can safely say that more than 9999 out of every 10,000 are *born* Muslims. This is true also of the Christian population, and no less true of the Buddhist population, and so on. Ours, positively, is not an age of conversions.

It is stimulating to think that cases of conversion through sheer *reasoning* between dogmas of two religions are very rare, perhaps non-existent. In cases of conversion where prosperity, social status, security, vengeance against native society, emotional experimentation and the like, are not the motives, the change of faith is motivated perhaps infinitely more frequently by love for charming virtues, of a magnetic person, or love for a group of lovable associates, than by cold religious arithmetic.

The theological content of the new faith in such cases is assimilated by rational exertions and study after the initial stepping in. After all,

the contents of the faith of a convert can easily become richer than the contents of the faith of those born into that faith.

The truth of the dogma of a religion is tested by standards of benevolent workability and its success. The successes of great faiths were not freaks of nature. Their founders were voices of their times. Mass conversion in the times when a new message gave fresh hopes of a better world was natural. Voluntary converts of such times accepted the new faith not by long contemplation, reading or arguing, but by a spontaneous response to a new message that spoke against existing wrong and inspired people both by its benevolence and perseverance, and later also by its success.

In our age the conversion of an individual of very primitive societies such as the untouchables in India, or tribal men in Africa or Australia or elsewhere, into Islam or Christianity or Buddhism or another great religion, is a great boon and blessing indeed for that convert, for it brings him or her into affiliation with great, rich and enlightened religious traditions.

From the Muslim point of view Prof. Cragg's book deserves sentence by sentence consideration, and a hundred other sentences of it can fruitfully be discussed at seminars with Muslim and Christian participants together. For few books among Christian writings contain such acutely suggestive observations about Islam and its current outlook as "The Call of the Minaret."

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THE TRINIDAD MUSLIM LEAGUE

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Of the present seven hundred thousand inhabitants of the island of Trinidad, British West Indies, approximately two hundred thousand are descendants of people who immigrated there as indentured laborers from India after the abolition of slavery in the British Colonies in 1834. From the first group, which arrived aboard the "Fatḥ al Rizq" in May, 1845, to the last, which landed in 1917, from the S. S. "Ganges," the total number of East Indian emigrants to Trinidad was 147,592. Today in their fourth generation, as professional and business men, clerks and government workers, skilled workmen and farmers, they consider themselves, above all, Trinidadians: Hindu Trinidadians, Muslim Trinidadians, or Christian Trinidadians. Some grandparents still speak very little English; whereas their grandchildren know no other language. Of the few who returned to India to live, most have not been happy there. However, the sentimental attachment which many population groups in the "New World" feel toward the lands of their ancestors is strong among Trinidadians of Indian descent. With sympathy and pride, they watched India's struggle for independence in the 1940s and felt a resurgence of interest in their cultural heritage. After the partition of the sub-continent, the attention of Trinidadian Hindus focused upon events in the State of India, while Trinidadian Muslims kept a close watch over the experiment of an Islamic state in Pakistan.

The Muslim community in Trinidad now numbers almost thirty-five thousand. Of these all save about sixty, who are converts of African descent, and a handful of Syrian Muslims, can trace their origins back to India. Although there are small groups of Shīᶜahs and Aḥmadis among them, close to three-quarters of the Trinidadian Muslims are Sunnis of the Ḥanifī school. These are conservative and include most of the wealthy, big business, and urban element of the Muslim community. Out of the Sunni community has emerged a small but vigorous group of progressive thinkers who consider themselves affiliated with no one school or sect but solely to the community of Islam in general.

EMERGENCE OF THE TRINIDAD MUSLIM LEAGUE

The progressives did not organize themselves as the Trinidad Muslim League until August 15,1947. Although this date was chosen to coincide with the establishment of the state of Pakistan, the Trinidad Muslim League has no official connection with the Muslim League constituted in 1906 by the Muslims of India. Instead it is the outgrowth of an attempt to revitalize Islam in Trinidad which goes back over two decades.

During the later years of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century, the Trinidadian Muslims had remained loyal to Islam. Yet, in the beginning, because of illiteracy and later, because of concentration on commercial and professional advancement, their beliefs had become rigid and their faith blind. Ceremonial replaced understanding and fanaticism, sensitivity. To combat this situation, the Anjuman Tahveeyatul Islam (The Society for the Revitalization of Islam) was found in 1926. By the time of its incorporation as a body representing the Muslims of Trinidad in 1931, it had made a good start in the work of unification and social development of the Muslims.

In that year there emerged into prominence a young man who has played a leading role in the Muslim community until this day, Al-Ḥajj Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī. For many years he had been away from Trinidad, studying Islamic theology at the Aḥmadiyyah Anjuman Ishaat-i-Islam in Lahore, at Al-Azhar, and at Cairo University, and travelling in much of Asia. Not long after his return to Trinidad, he was appointed Mufti by the Anjuman Tahveeyatul Islam. Teaching Islam according to new thought and scientific discoveries, he introduced an era of inquiry and examination. Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī also preached that woman must take an active part in social and religious affairs. In opposition to the thinking and reforms of the Anjuman Tahveeyatul Islam, a few members seceded and formed the Anjuman Sunna wa'l-Jamāᶜah, wishing to adhere more closely to the doctrines of the Ḥanifī school. This Society strongly opposed and criticized the idea of Muslim women participating with men in religious and social affairs. The gulf between the two groups widened. The Anjuman Sunna wa'l-Jamāᶜah obtained the services of a learned Sunni Moulvi from India to strengthen their position but after a year dispensed with his services. The deposed Moulvi founded a third group in 1940, the Anjuman Tablīgh-al Islam, with, as its name implies, an emphasis on propaganda through education. Although this group subscribed largely to the doctrines of the Ḥanifī school, after the death of its founder in 1943 it amalgamated with the Anjuman Tahveeyatul Islam. The following year, the division of opinion reappeared within the Anjuman Tahveeyatul Islam, and the group headed by Amīr ᶜAli reluctantly withdrew from the amalgamation after having placed their hopes in a unified community for fifteen years. They were determined that Islam should not be stifled within the narrow limits of conformity and sectarian boundaries. After a thorough study of world Islamic conditions, they founded the Trinidad Muslim League as a Ghair Muqallad (Nonconformist) body.

LEADERS OF THE TRINIDAD MUSLIM LEAGUE

The spiritual head of the fifteen hundred members of the Trinidad Muslim League is their Mufti, Al-Hajj Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī. Through

his activity and leadership in the Anjuman Tahveeyatul Islam, the League can claim a heritage of reform and progress dating back well over a quarter of a century. A man of great vigor and dignity, he was kind enough to grant the writer an interview in his home at a particularly busy time, the day after his daughter's wedding. He is the owner and operator of a poultry feed and grain business, with which one of his sons helps him, in the Trinidad capital, Port of Spain. His wife, a woman of great charm and grace, is very active in community affairs.

The President of the Trinidad Muslim League is Mr. Muḥammad Rafīq. Formerly a vice-President, he became President in succession to Mr. ᶜAzīz Aḥmad, a transport and general contractor for oilfields in the south of the island under whom the difficult task of completing the League's mosque was effected. Though a businessman, the proprietor of a general store and cinema, the bulk of Muḥammad Rafīq's time since his youth has been spent in religious pursuits, writing articles and poems on Islam, serving as Muslim Marriage Officer, formulating plans for the guidance of the League and raising funds for it. One of the few articles published outside of Trinidad on the Muslim community there was written by him for the September, 1954, issue of the English journal, *Islamic Review.*

Two men with the same name now share the vice-Presidency, Mr. Muḥammad Yaᶜqūb Khān of San Fernando and Mr. Muḥammad Yaᶜqūb Khān of Curepe. The Secretary of the League is Mr. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, an accountant and the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Nazīr Muḥammad, a member of the Port of Spain Electricity Board and of the League's Education Board. Mrs. Amīna Rahamut is the President of the Women's Movement of the League. A social worker, she has travelled extensively and made the pilgrimage to Mecca. The vice-President of the Women's Movement is Mrs. Nuroon Amīr ᶜAlī, the wife of the Mufti. The President's wife, Mrs. Khairoon Muḥammad Rafīq, the mother of seven children and manager of a large dry goods and hardware store, was one of the founders of the Women's Movement and a League Council Member from its inception. Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī and Mr. Muḥammad Rafīq are the League's Trustees.

The parent body of the League in St. Joseph's, just outside Port of Spain, is aided by several branches in the towns and districts of Trinidad. A District Committee informs and advises the League's Council of the happenings and welfare of Muslims throughout the Colony.

BELIEFS OF THE TRINIDAD MUSLIM LEAGUE

The Trinidad Muslim League believes that anyone is a Muslim who sincerely recites the Shahādah, witnessing that "There is but one God, and Muḥammad is the Messenger of God." Nothing makes one a kāfir (unbeliever) except a denial of this creed. On religious matters

the only absolute authorities are the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of Muḥammad. The individual should not be a Muqallad (conformist) to any one of the legal codifications of the four Sunni schools, but instead he should be a Mujtahid (striver) in the exercise of his own reason and judgment. Taqlīd (conformism) is contrary to the spirit of Islamic teachings, which emphasize individual responsibility. It has crushed the spirit of inquiry and critical study among Muslims and for centuries plunged them into an intellectual and spiritual stupor. Having ruined the intellectual genius of the Muslims in the realm of law and the speculative philosophy of religion, it has caused the dis-integration of the Ummah (community) of Muḥammad.

In general a Ghair Muqallad (non-conformist) does not blindly follow any one of the Four Sunnī schools. He believes that their Imāms were fallible and so open to questioning. Contrary to orthodox belief, he asserts that the Door of Ijtihād (striving) is not and cannot be closed, because life is a process of progressive understanding and requires that each generation, taking the Qur'ān and the Sunnah as its highest authority and guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, solve its own current problems.

The Trinidad Muslim League adheres to the Qur'ān and to the Books of Ḥadīth and on matters not covered by them looks for guidance to the pronouncements of the Four Schools. Where there is disagreement among the Four Schools, they are guided by what they judge to be most in keeping with the Qur'ān and the Sunna. On a legal issue about which there is no clear ruling in the Qur'ān or the words or example of Muḥammad as recorded in the Books of Ḥadīth, the Mufti or the Qāḍī or anyone in authority or a council elected for the purpose can, according to reason and judgment, make a decision. On metaphysical matters, the individual may accept any theory compatible with his reason and judgment, but the theory must not be contrary to any fundamental teaching of Islam.

It has been an active belief of the Trinidad Muslim League that the seclusion of women was contradictory to the spirit of Islam and that women should work side by side with men and be granted equal opportunities in the spiritual and social development of the community.

EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE TRINIDAD MUSLIM LEAGUE

When Muslims first came to Trinidad, only one or two percent of them were truly literate. Gradually a small number of boys who could be spared from the suger cane fields were enrolled in the Canadian Mission Schools (of the Presbyterian Church) primarily to learn English. Along with other studies conducted in Hindi, they were taught Christianity. Whereas this program produced a number of converts to Christianity, mostly from among the Hindus, it spurred the Muslims to open Maktabs for the teaching of Urdu and the language of

their religion, Arabic, and so to fill what they considered to be the gap left by Christian schools. Girls, whose place was in the home, were permitted to go to the Maktab if they could find time for it, but they had no other education and did not learn English.

Until 1949, neither the Hindu nor the Muslim community was recognized by law as a religious denomination and therefore neither was eligible to receive government aid in support of schools. Only Christian denominations received government subsidies. The Marryat and Mayhew Report of 1932 recommended that the Indian community as a whole should have its own schools corresponding to the schools of the Christian community and that the Indian community form an association for that purpose. Four years later, Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī was appointed the first non-Christian member of the Board by the Governor on the advice of the Director of Education. In 1938, supported by the Director of Education, he began to agitate for implementation of the Marryat and Mayhew Report. In the same year the Indian Educational Association was formed with Amīr ᶜAlī its elected president. After lengthy discussion, made abortive by the religious differences within the Indian community, concerning the financing and control of the Indian schools, Amīr ᶜAlī notified the Educational Board that he was going to offer a resolution in favor of granting the Hindu and Muslim denominations the same aid and facilities to run schools as the Christian denominations received. The Board asked him to withdraw the resolution, promising in return to exert every effort to found such a school as he wanted. Motivated by the principle of equal benefits for equal taxation, Amīr ᶜAlī went ahead with the submission of the resolution, but it was defeated. He was advised to test the validity of the existing law by starting a school in the Islamic Hall at San Juan. In compliance with this suggestion, he sent in an application for an Indian school on a national basis, which the Board received favorably. Much to the Board's surprise and to Amir ᶜAlī's relief, the forward-looking governor, Sir Hubert Young, vetoed it on the grounds that he could not allow a school to be established on a national basis and that the law must make provision to include Muslims and Hindus in the Denominational Ordinance. Before the purpose of the Governor could be accomplished, he was recalled and the matter again shelved. Not until 1949 was the Denominational Ordinance expanded to include Hindu and Muslim schools in government aid and the first non-Christian denominational school of the Colony, established by the Anjuman Tahveeyatul Islam, given a governmental grant-in-aid.

At present the Hindus have about thirty primary schools and the Muslims fourteen, the Sunnah wa-l-Jamāᶜah six, the Tahveeyatul Islam five, and the Trinidad Muslim League three. The Trinidad Muslim League has also established Maktabs in various parts of the island to teach Urdu and Arabic. The Maktabs go only to the third

grade, after which time the children have too much homework in their regular schools to continue with them. As a fair number of Muslim children go on to secondary school, the League looks forward to establishing a denominational secondary school and eventually a college. They envisage that one of the most important effects of increased Muslim education will be a greater understanding and unity among all Muslims.

As another medium of education, the League publishes a bulletin containing articles on Islam, news of the community, and special features for children.

ACTIVITIES OF THE TRINIDAD MUSLIM LEAGUE IN SOCIAL CONCERNS

Through the persistence of Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī, the Immigration Marriage Ordinance was superseded in 1935 by the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Ordinance. It provides for divisional Divorce Officers over whom the government courts have no control. Because it now stands open to abuse, it is under petition for revision. Its principal weakness is that it makes no effective provision for the maintenance of divorced wives and their children. A common sequence of events is: a vexed wife returns to the home of her parents, refuses to return to her husband, and sues him for maintenance; the husband goes to the divorce officer and, with or without the aid of a heavy fee, is granted a divorce. When the women sues her husband for maintenance in the civil court, the divorce officer tells the court that the woman is already divorced, and, since she is no longer a wife, under the present Muslim Marriage and Divorce Ordinance she is not entitled to maintenance; the case is dismissed. To avoid this, many Muslims now have the marriages of their daughters registered, not in accordance with the Muslim Marriage Ordinance but in accordance with the ordinance of civil marriages.

Approximately ten percent of marriages registered under the Muslim Marriage Ordinance end in divorce. Three out of five divorces are attributed to the unwillingness of the husband to maintain the children. Among Muslims whose marriages have been registered under the civil laws, there has not been a single divorce. For the year 1955, out of twenty-nine Muslim divorces, only two were members of the Trinidad Muslim League; in 1956 out of thirty only one was a member of the League. There are not more than eight cases of polygamy in Trinidad, none of which involves more than two wives.

Trinidad Muslim League men and women are active in welfare work, contributing to emergency relief on and off the island, aiding the poor, and visiting the inmates of institutions. A youth movement of the League assists in this work as well as in the encouragement of sports among young and old.

THE JINNAH MEMORIAL MOSQUE

One of the objects of the Trinidad Muslim League is the establishment of mosques and Islamic cultural centers. To the more than fifty mosques already existing in various parts of Trinidad, the League added the Jinnah Memorial Mosque in 1954.

The decision to construct a mosque at League Center in St. Joseph was made in 1948. A geographically perfect location about ten miles east of Port of Spain, the site lies between the main highway out of the capital and the main line of the railway running to the largely-Indian oil-town of San Fernando; but it is separated from the traffic of both, protected from the railway by the League Center building and from the highway by a far-spreading saman tree. Instead of building a simple rectangular structure similar to the other mosques of Trinidad, the League turned to the mosques of the old world for inspiration. They conceived a hexagonal building dominated at the Miḥrāb and opposite end by double balconied minarets eighty feet high. Between the minarets, at the center of the mosque, a dome rises to a height of forty feet. Atop the dome is an electrified crescent, while at its base it is surrounded by four semi-domes and eight miniature minarets. On the north and south sides of the mosque, double doorways lead to the interior from arched porches elevated from the ground by five shallow steps following the pattern of the hexagon.

The interior of the mosque measures forty by sixty feet. The ceiling is eighteen feet from the floor. The dome is supported by two lateral arches decorated with the ninety-nine most beautiful names of God, inscribed by a member of the congregation, Mr. Muḥammed ᶜAbdul Ḥāfiẓ. Above the main chamber of the mosque the four semi-domes provide space, protected by a three-foot iron railing, for silent meditation.

His Excellency, M. A. H. Ispahani, then Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States of America, laid the foundation stone of the mosque on November 10, 1948, but actual construction of the concrete building did not begin until January 31, 1951, when Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī offered a short prayer and removed the first shovelful of earth. Generous gifts of members and well-wishers and funds, raised through bazaars, excursions, and parties, provided the initial costs of the building, but as time went on and costs continued to rise the financial burden of the construction became discouragingly heavy. The energetic leadership of Mr. ᶜAzīz Aḥmad and Mr. Muḥammed Rafīq merits much of the credit for the early completion of the mosque, the final cost of which was $ 120,000 B. W. I. ($ 80,000 U. S.).

The Jinnah Memorial Mosque, dedicated to the father of the Islamic State of Pakistan for his "sacrificial devotion to the highest Islamic ideals," was formally opened on April 25, 1954, by the Mufti of the League, Al-Ḥajj Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī.

WEDDING IN THE JINNAH MEMORIAL MOSQUE

It is typical of the diversity and friendliness of the people of Trinidad that two American Quakers staying at the guest house of a Roman Catholic monastery founded by Dutch monks should meet there a Presbyterian of Hindu extraction and through him be invited to a Muslim wedding. The first wedding in all Trinidad ever to be held in a mosque and in which the bride was not represented by a proxy but contracted her marriage personally made an historic event. It was further distinguished by being the marriage of the daughter of the League's Mufti, Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī, and the son of a prominent Port of Spain businessman, Mr. Yusuf Ḥusein Boos. Many members of the League spent the day before, a Saturday, helping with the preparations. The kitchen of the Mosque Hall buzzed with womenfolk while a man kneaded and rolled the dough, making rotis (pharata), mutton curry, and dhal for the pre-wedding luncheon. Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī and Mr. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, the League's Secretary, showed the writer around the mosque and its minarets and told something of its history. The conversation turned to the wedding and to the marriage arrangements of the League. When we asked what role parents played in the betrothal of a young couple, Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī told us that, although their consent was always obtained, parents of his persuasion had twenty years ago relinquished total responsibility for arranging the marriages of their children. In the rare cases when a boy under twenty-one or a girl under eighteen wishes to marry, the Muslim Marriage Law of the Colony of Trinidad requires the consent of the parents or a legal guardian appointed by the Governor. How had Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī's daughter become engaged? While the groom was a student, he had lived at his father's request with the bride's family to be near his school. As Moazam approached graduation, Mr. Boos aften mentioned to Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī that he would like to see his son married. Moazam had made some suggestions, but they had not been acceptable to his father. One afternoon when the four parents were driving back from the country, Mr. Boos mentioned guardedly that he inferred from Moazam's conversation some attraction towards the ᶜAlīs' youngest daughter, Ṭāhira. After he had asked Ṭāhira her feeling and received a positive reply, Moulvi Amīr ᶜAlī told Mr. Boos he thought the temperaments and physical appearance of the two young people compatible. Mr. Boos chuckled with pleasure and said he would speak to Moazam. With the assent of Ṭāhira and Moazam an engagement party was held to which forty friends were invited. Presents were exchanged and the engagement announced.

On Sunday, October 1, 1956, at 11. a.m. at the Jinnah Memorial Mosque most of the wedding luncheon guests had already assembled and were conversing on the lawns and porches of the Mosque Hall. Though some of the women wore saris, the majority wore the orhani,

a head-scarf drawn across the bosom. Except on special occasions no one wears the sari, but many wear the orhani all the time. The younger generation, however, are beginning to discard it.

At 11.30 a.m. about a hundred people entered the Mosque Hall to eat the wedding banquet. The hall was beautifully decorated with white paper garlands and ferns. Long tables were draped in white and at one end of the hall, the raised platform was also draped with white and edged with flowers. A settee in the center waited to seat the bride and groom after the ceremony. People had travelled many hours from all parts of Trinidad to witness the ceremony and gathered in clusters, mostly men with men and women with women, after lunch to hear news of one another. A rather shy looking man, not as well dressed as the rest and carrying a cane, sat by himself apart from the others. We asked who he was and were told, "He is beggar. Such a one is always expected at a gathering like this and is always welcome."

By 2 p.m. at least a thousand guests had gathered and whispers began to circulate that the bride was "about to arrive." Over the loud speakers in the eaves of the Mosque Hall the voice of Mr. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm asked us to go into the mosque and take our places. Almost before anyone was aware of it, the groom had entered and sat down on a dais covered by oriental carpeting in front of the miḥrāb. Dressed in a light blue gabardine suit, he wore on his head a magnificent turban, wound with a length of about two feet falling down his back. Several more minutes passed, and then a bridesmaid was glimpsed in the doorway. A man came in to adjust the microphones by the miḥrāb where the marriage officer took his place.

Now there was a sustained flurry on the doorway. At last the bride's two sisters, as bridesmaids, entered the mosque and walked slowly, single-file, across to the center aisle which the congregation parted to make for them. A moment later, at first hesitantly, the bride came through the doorway. Her gharara was of white satin, studded with brilliants and seed pearls and embroidered with silver roses. Her face was uncovered, but over her black hair she were a fine white veil fringed with beads and pearls and caught at her center part by a pearl jhalak which rested upon the middle of her forehead. Slowly, solemnly, demurely, she walked by herself down the center aisle between the men and the women. The groom stood to greet her and they sat down, she at his right, on the carpet-covered diwan. The service began.

Mr. Muḥammad Rafīq, the marriage officer, intoned the Fātiḥah in Arabic and other verses from the Qur'ān, first in Arabic and then in English:

> "O people! Be mindful of your duty to your Lord, Who has created you from a single substance and its mate of it and spread, from these two, many men and women; be mindful of your

duty to God, by Whom you make requests of one another, and be mindful of the women who bore you. For God is watching over you."...Surah iv.1.

"O believers! Be mindful of God as He deserves, and do not die save in surrender."...Surah iii.101.

"O believers! Be mindful of God and say well-guided words that God may bless your deeds for you and forgive you your sins. Whoever obeys God and His messenger has already been greatly blessed."...Surah xxxiii.70-71.

He then read a sermon in English:

..."The young people have decided to take upon themselves the responsibilities of the matrimonial vow. This sacred vow is taken by the couple in the presence of God and man at the time of their marriage. ...In different religions the principle (of marriage) is the same only varying in details of ceremonials. In Islam marriage is one of the most important of the restricted regulations, as it forms the basic principle of human civilization... Almighty God created the universe out of love... The love and affection which exist between husband and wife ... continue to expand among the family, then go to the community, and so nations are built, and the world is intertwined by love."

He described the home influences of the bride and groom and their characters. Admonishing them to be a constant source of comfort and happiness to one another, he prayed that the blessings of God might be upon them. After congratulating the parents on the marriage, he took the marriage assent from the groom, who placed a ring upon the bride's finger, and then from the bride. "According to Islamic law there must not be any force or coercion from any source whatsoever. The bride and the groom must of their own free will give their assent to the marriage, together with the presentation of a dowry from groom to bride." He pronounced the invocation, and the ceremony was over.

An invitation to the reception in the Mosque Hall came over the loudspeakers, and the guests pressed out, sorting their shoes as they reached the doors. The bride and groom remained inside, talking with the marriage officer and their parents, and were the last to leave the mosque. When they came out, they went directly to the Mosque Hall where they seated themselves on the settee prepared for them on the platform. Refreshments consisting of punch and cakes were passed among the guests, and the phonograph once again provided a background of eastern music. After a while leaders of the community and distinguished guests went to the platform and, prefacing their remarks with quotations from the Qurʾān, spoke eloquently about the bride

and groom and wished them happiness. The newlyweds continued to sit quietly on the platform, for the most part alone and solemn, until about 5 p.m. Then a gleaming red sedan drove up to the Mosque Hall, and they were escorted to it by as many as could crowd close. These well-wishers were rewarded by the radiant smiles which at last relaxed the faces of young Mr. and Mrs. Moazam Boos as they entered the car.

They planned a two week honeymoon at a seaside resort on the other side of the island. When they returned, it would be to live with the groom's parents.

Under the sunset-bathed minarets, the guests began gradually to depart, having witnessed what may be called a symbol in the life of the Trinidad Muslim League. The marriage of members of two leading families in the mosque meant a precedent and proclaimed that this most basic personal and social relationship should not remain only a civil contract but should stress Quranic injunction and religious obligation.

The Trinidad Muslim League, as other Muslim groups in Islamic countries, is embarked on an effort to revitalize Islam by going back over the heads of the medieval commentators to the essential Islam, to the 7th century Book and Prophet. Its members are fortunate to live on the ascendant capital island of the newly federated British West Indies at a time when its varied peoples are eager to move forward together. They are not out to teach the world to do as they do, but their alert yet relaxed example of curiosity and tolerance cannot help but impress the observer.

Cambridge, Massachusetts MARY ARNETT

Muḥammed at Medina. By W. Montgomery Watt, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. xiv, 478, 42s.

This volume continues the study of the life of the Prophet Muḥammad begun by the author in his *Muhammad at Mecca.* The period after the Flight to Medina was to prognosticate the future development of the Islamic community and influenced the direction it was to take. But the character of Muḥammad is the theme of the two works and it is not easy to review one volume without the other. Dr. Watt is inclined to deprecate the traditional distinction made between the character of the Prophet at Mecca and later at Medina but this division into two books would lead one to think that some such distinction still lingers in the author's mind.

But he has produced in this second part a careful and scholarly study including many excursuses on special matters, and has subjected his sources to severe scrutiny to present a new appraisement of the economic, social and political background of Muḥammad's time and in particular the bearing of it on his actions and character. In the former volume Dr. Watt outlines the limits he has placed upon himself whether wisely or not we shall notice later. "On the theological questions at issue between Christianity and Islam an attempt has been made to preserve neutrality." The attitude of Christianity to Islam "must be based on theological principles, I would readily admit that my book is incomplete in this respect, but would claim that it presents Christians with the historical material which must be taken into account in forming the theological judgment." "There need be no unbridgeable gulf between Western scholarship and Islamic faith." "The historian of the mid-twentieth century ... wants to ask many questions about the economic, social and political background ... questions which have hardly been raised in the past."

The volume opens with Muslims under Muḥammad's leadership on the offensive against the Quraish. "The Muslims are told that God prefers fighters to those who sit still ... for the fighters there is a mighty hire, a reward in Paradise. Clearly the Muslims regarded their political and military activities as taking place within a religious setting." The attack in the sacred month of Rajab was an evidence of zeal against paganism though Dr. Watt thinks that the objection raised by Muḥammad's new followers was not so much because they had remnants of veneration for the old cult as that they feared the hazardous nature of the adventure. Muḥammad's opinion of it is found by reference to Surah ii.214. At any rate Dr. Watt does not think that the attack in the month of truce was contemplated by Muḥammad as "anything scandalous or dishonourable." However this may be, implications for a general judgement are involved in the choice of the raid as a religious method and fully a third of the book is concerned with accounts of these raids in various directions to bring about a unification of the Arab peoples.

On p. 142 there begins an account of the success of Muḥammad's policy. Considering himself called at first to his own tribe, the Quraish,

Muḥammad gradually "came to see his mission as a wider one... With the Hijrah the notion of an *ummah* or community with a religious basis became prominent. The most urgent problem of this community was the establishment of peace between the various clans of Medina. This was a problem, however, not merely in Medina but throughout Arabia." The economic problem was also urgent. "A new source of wealth was required." "At first, Muḥammad may have looked to trade (but ... there was the danger that trade would foster the false religious attitude that had been the fault of the pagan Meccans") (a phrase which needs some further explanation) "Muḥammad felt that trade was not the solution... In a sense the solution Muḥammad chose was booty from non-Muslims." This seems to have an echo not so remote in time! The quest of booty drove him northwards.

"If we are to understand the relative importance of religious and non-religious motives in the conversion of seventh-century Arabs to Islam, we must get rid of the current Western idea that politics and religion exist in separate compartments, and we must not expect emotional conversions... Islam provided an economic social and political system, the Pax Islamica. Of this system religion was an integral part; it may be called the ideological aspect of the system"... "The essential question came to be whether to enter the Islamic system or to remain outside it." With this judgement we are in firm agreement, but it should be noted that it has important implications for the understanding of the character of the Divine community and the nature of religion, which are theological questions. Islam was not unique at this period in history in this view of religion, as the harassed people on the borders of the Byzantine and the Persian Empires knew only too well. The religion or sect of the temporarily dominant was accepted almost without choice, and populations of cities alternated between Melkite, Nestorian and Jacobite allegiance.

Chapter 5 proceeds to discuss the political groupings in Arabia before Muḥammad, a subject which bristles with difficulties where sources are mixed with the tendentious, the fictitious and the unreliable. Even Aws and Khazraj may be "inventions of the genealogists." Dr. Watt has had a thankless task here and has shown commendable perseverance. The object he has in view is to measure the sort of political backing which Muḥammad had from the tribes; the details are for the examination of specialists. For the internal politics of Medina "at many points we have to rely on conjecture and probabilities" (p. 180). The chapter on Muḥammad's relations with the Jews at Medina is one of the best in the book, but one doubts the interpretation placed upon Surah iii.109 f (p. 197) and the postulation of a Jewish *ummah* alongside the Muslim *ummah* in "the same political unity" needs more substantiation. No doubt the Jews who did not agree with Muḥammad were irritating. But one would hesitate to say: "It is not surprising that two of their leaders were assassinated by Muslims" (pp. 212f) for some wicked horseplay and on an unsupported suspicion, or for being neutral as in the case of Quraiẓah.

The book moves on to the inevitable appraisal of the character of Muḥammad in which Dr. Watt has tried to be objective and fair. But

it is here where one feels the limits set are a handicap both to him and to his reader. If one assesses the character of Muḥammad can one do it without going fully into theological questions. Was Muḥammad inspired? What do we mean by inspiration? Dr. Watt frequently speaks of Muḥammad's revelation though he says in his earlier preface that he does not say "God says" or "Muḥammad says" when he quotes the Qurʾān but only "the Qurʾān says" so as not to prejudge the theological question.

The writing of a life of Muḥammad is a thankless task. How can one write of a figure in history who has assumed more than ordinary human dimensions because of the pieties and devotions of millions of people? The believers will take one side of uncritical judgement and the unbeliever the other; who is able to arbitrate and stand unmoved by either side? How can true objectivity be found? Even the desire to conciliate and take a middle position may be as nauseous as the Laodicean. When one says: "I will assess this character by reference to the standards of the day", one has the lurking suspicion that you interpret the standards of the day by the character you are discussing. Was Cromwell a good man? What about the events at Drogheda? Did he claim to be a Divine instrument? How can such matters be fully met except on theological principles? Dr. Watt has done his best in this difficult field and has not let slip his critical judgement though many opinions will be entertained as to the success of his diagnosis. What he says on p. 334 is the plain truth "Towards convincing Christian Europe that Muḥammad is a moral exemplar, however, little, indeed nothing, has so far been accomplished."

Even if one differs from Dr. Watt's opinions in some cases one must be grateful to him for this good piece of research.

Selly Oak, Birmingham, England J. W. Sweetman

Living Religions of the World. By Frederic Spiegelberg, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956. pp. x, 511.

The author of this book has produced an interesting and challenging study in the realm of comparative religion. His point of view in approaching this vital subject follows a new line of thought. At the beginning he asserts that the basic factor common to *all* religions is *Faith* ... or, if you will, a positive belief in the existence of an ultimate, undergirding reality, designated by him as "Being of Being" ... calling it Brahma, Allah, or God ... the creator of "the Miracle of Being," i.e. the Universe. So it follows that religion itself is part and parcel of the very nature of Man. Therefore, all religions of man, in one form or another, have given expression to belief in the universal "Being of Being" and have developed their various concepts of belief and worship.

It is with this *basic* philosophy of religion, as a natural urge of Man that the author proceeds to consider the various religious beliefs and practices of *The Living Religions of the World.* One by one, and from the standpoint of the above mentioned "basic philosophy," he first of all discusses the religions rooted in India: Vedaism, Brahmanism,

Later Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism together with its modified developments in Ceylon, Burma, China and Japan, including an excellent exposition of Zen Buddhism of Japan as over against Shinto and its cult of Nationalism. The author, who has travelled extensively in Tibet, gives a unique personal account of the curious development of Mahayana Buddhism as found in that country with its two ruling authorities: the Dalai Lama responsible for political affairs, and the Panchen Lama responsible for religious matters.

Following a brief chapter on Zoroastrianism, the author turns to a consideration of Islam and Sufism-Islam in its mystical development. Unfortunately this chapter is altogether too brief to give anything like an adequate summary of the significant religious doctrines and practices of the Muslim world. Indeed, this chapter on Islam and Sufism is the least satisfactory in the entire volume. On the other hand, the following chapter on Sikhism is a splendid summary of its origin and development. However, at the bottom of p. 430, there is an unfortunate mis-quotation of the Arabic words used in the Muslim call to prayer which the muezzin chants from the minaret of the mosque five times a day, every day everywhere in the Muslim world. It should, of course, read. "Lā ilāha illa Allāh wa Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh." "There is no god but Allah and Muḥammad is the messenger of God."

The author's estimate of the Sikh religion is well stated, where he declares on p. 434 that "the Sikh religion is a notable result of the intrusion of the Moslem into the Hindu world that profoundly influenced the later development of Hindu thought." However, it would be more acceptable had he clearly and concretely indicated how this "intrusion" so "*profoundly influenced*" the development of Hindu thought.

In the final chapter on Christianity the author significantly points out the fundamental difference between the concept of the flow of Time as viewed by the Eastern religions generally, and Christianity of the West. In general, Eastern religions basically have a conception of Time as a revolving wheel. On the other hand the West conceives of the flow of Time as an endless horizontal straight line, on which important events can be definitely fixed. On this straight line the vertical cross of Christianity stands as the point from which all events of time can be, and are given specific dates, both *before* and *after* the *birth*date of Christ. It is interesting to note how these opposing conceptions of the "flow of time" have influenced the development of religious thought in both East and West.

All students of world religions will be grateful to the author for this book, with new and fresh insights into the basic nature of the religions of men. What he has written vividly reflects the results of his recent travels in India and the Far East especially. However, it is likely that this book will be found more useful as a supplementary aid in a course on *Living Religions* than as a text book for that subject.

Dr. Spiegelberg is at present serving as Professor of Indian Culture and Thought in the Department of Asiatic Studies at Stanford University in California.

Stratford-on-Avon, England MURRAY T. TITUS

Der Islam, seine Geschichte, seine Lehre, seine Wesen. By Emanuel Kellerhals, Basle, Verlag der Basler Missionsbuchhandlung, and Stuttgart, Evang. Missionsverlag, 1956, p. 403. (First published 1945), Fr. 19.80.

The author states that he is not an Arabist, but his footnotes and text show that he is a profound scholar of Western writings on Islam. One of the most valuable parts of his book is the survey in chapter XII of Christian and Western attitudes to Islam from John Damascene through Raymond Lull and Luther to the lay and missionary scholars of our own time. He himself has set out to study Islām from a purely Christian standpoint. He holds that religions cannot be assessed in accordance with secular values or man-made philosophical and historical criteria, that there cannot be a "science" of "comparative religion" because science and religion are on different planes.

Although it is not intended for them, lay students will find this book useful. Not only are various aspects of Islam clearly and objectively outlined, but their *Zusammenhang* is explained in ways which are most illuminating. The expository paragraphs are kept strictly separate from those in which matters are discussed from a Christian theological standpoint. Chapters I and II give the clearest summary of the spiritual history of Rome and Byzantium and of pre-Islamic Arabia which this reviewer has found anywhere, though the important but obscure problem of the contemporary spiritual history of Persia does not, except for a paragraph on Manichaeism, receive attention.

Certain criticisms must, however, be made. The modern reform movements initiated by Shaikh Muḥammad ᶜAbduh and Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān are dismissed in a few paragraphs (pp. 295-297) which speak more of their political repercussions than of their spiritual significance and implications. Insufficient consideration is given to Sufism and Shīᶜite messianism, which from medieval to quite recent times set the tone of Muslim literature, art and social life, and proportionately overmuch to *Gesetzreligion*, which, despite revivalist efforts, has long been and still is on the wane. The chapters on Muslim history are excellent as far as the break of the ᶜAbbāsid empire, but thereafter present a picture of mere decay. There is no consideration of the Crusades, of the conversion of the Persian and Russian Mongols, of the spread of Islam in predominantly Sufi forms through Asia Minor, India, Indonesia and Africa or of the culmination of religious art in Persian literature and Ottoman, Safavid and Moghul architecture. The statements about Turkish Islam on p. 288 can only be described as false.

In his discussions of various historically manifested aspects of Islām, the author assumes that the reader is acquainted with the relevant aspects of Christianity. Yet Christianity, perhaps even more than Islam, has during its history and among and within its churches found expression in numerous and varied aspects. The historical and spatial comparison of all these aspects in both religions would be a possible approach to overcoming this difficulty, but Dr. Kellerhals does not follow it because it would contradict his basic premise.

Institute of Islamic Studies, Montreal. F. R. C. Bagley

Le Système Philosophique des Muᶜtazila. By Albert N. Nader, Institut de Lettres Orientales de Beyrouth, 1956. pp. 354/xx, paper.

The traditional method to study the Muᶜtazilah school of thought is to follow the scheme of the "five roots." But our author essays to show that to understand the Muᶜtazilah one must go beyond this convenient scheme and see the system as a whole as it develops a rich variety of themes from theology and metaphysics to physics and psychology. Viewed in this light, one discovers that the system in its comprehensiveness has cohesion.

The author attempts a reconstruction of the Muᶜtazilah in its all-inclusiveness. In his foreword he states the general principle deduced from all documents examined, namely, that "reason, sufficiently developed, is able, through its own insights and before any revelation, to discover the great truths that go back to two themes: the first, that the existence of the world supposes a transcendental Being which gave it this existence, and this Being is absolutely one and perfect; the second, that man acts freely and is responsible for his acts." (p. xi).

But before treating Muᶜtazilite doctrines the author situates the movement in its historical context, beginning with the Khawārij and introducing the reader to the leading Muᶜtazilites in Basrah and Baghdad, of whom Wāṣil of Basrah of course heads the list, or, more precisely, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. Among the Arabic authors cited as sources are: Al-Shahrastānī, Ibn-Ḥazm, Al-Isfarāʾīnī, Al-Baghdādī, Al-Ījī, Al-Khayyāṭ, Al-Ashᶜarī, Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Al-Jāḥiẓ and, of modern times, Aḥmad Amīn.

With the help of these and many others, not to mention European scholars, the writer sets about to disengage the main themes, to classify and to catalogue, to expound in orderly fashion the principal tenets of the Muᶜtazilite philosophical school. This is done in two sections: first, Monotheism, comprising the study of God and the cosmos; second, God's Justice (i.e. involving the freedom of the will), which comprises an investigation of psychological, moral and political problems.

Under these general headings the author treats all of the questions of importance raised and discussed by the Muᶜtazilites during the two centuries of their influence, quoting from the various writers of the period. The reader will appreciate the logic and order with which the study is conducted. If the tenets of the Muᶜtazilites were of sufficient moment to result in inquisitional procedures by both their opponents and protagonists in the early days, they are not entirely void of significance for Muslim theologians and philosophers today, and may eventually reappear as burning issues in Islam. Herein lie the justification and utility of this scholarly work.

Hartford Seminary Foundation,
Hartford, Connecticut. E. H. Douglas

A Handbook on the Contemporary Middle East. Sectional Introductions with Annotated Bibliographies. by H. B. Sharabi. Washington, D.C., Georgetown University, 1956. pp. 113.

The Middle East attracts a wide variety of students today. There are

those who may be travelling to or living in some Middle Eastern country for the first time, who very often know little or nothing about the area until they are on the point of being plunged into it. At the opposite extreme are the long-established experts who have made this part of the world their primary concern over many years. The present Handbook will be of interest to both types, but is designed to be more useful to the former than the latter. It provides a compact and interesting introduction to the geography, politics and economics of each country in the area, and then lists the most important books and recent articles that have appeared on each of these aspects of the life of each country. There is the same kind of treatment for the area as a whole.

The bibliographical compilation is by far the more extensive, and for the trained student the more useful, part of the book. It provides an illuminating survey of the writing which has been done on each country and aspect of the Middle East, especially in recent years. Here even the expert may find some items that he needs to examine.

The rapid progression of events has already made some of the commentary sections out of date and the continuous publication of new books has already made the bibliography inadequate at certain points, but these are handicaps from which any study of the Middle East must suffer today. The author has sifted all the major sources of information and the product of his sifting is to be welcomed as a useful tool for other students.

Divinity School, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. CHARLES W. FORMAN

The Ideas of Arab Nationalism. By Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, Cornell University Press, 1956, pp. xiii/227, $ 4.00.

We are glad to give a welcome to this book both for its author's sake as a representative Jordanian "Arab" of experience and knowledgability and for the sake of the subject-matter, at a time when a proper understanding of the contemporary thought in the Near East is essential for those in the west who would regard the multifarious problems sympathetically and constructively, be they missionaries, diplomats or "oil" experts. The book is well-written and attractively arranged. The chapters are not too long and usually contain a paragraph which it would be well to remember. Dr. Nuseibeh avoids any tendency to rest satisfied with past achievements, criticises his contemporaries, and realizes that the task of reintegration has scarcely begun. He recognizes the contribution of Christian missions, more particularly in the realm of education, towards Arab renaissance. We are reminded of a former minister of Education, also from Jordan, who said he regarded such education as "a window to the west." This attitude should put the West on its mettle as much as the Near East. The events of the autumn of 1956 do not mean the severing of "cultural relations." Dr. Nuseibeh constitutes a worth-while instance of a recent dictum that the Near Easterner through western education is in a position to know more about the west than a similarly placed westerner who has not had the opportunity of education in the reverse

direction; but in Dr. Nuseibeh's case it means too that he knows his own "home lands" from a distance as well as near at hand. He would in fact rejoice to see a federation of culture and thought as essential as anything more politically integrating.

The eleven chapters with an Appendix roam through the antecedent and current factors in Arab political thought. The fifth chapter is frank and valuable in this connection, as that on political thought between the wars (8). Some sentences in the latter make stern reading. "A system of colonial rule, masquerading in the guise of mandatory trusts was imposed on (the Arab countries) against their wishes." (p. 149). In this context the restrained allusions to Israel are wise — few as they are. Other sentences scattered through the volume are worth genuine consideration, the more so when the Arab political scene is so badly grasped in the West. "The weakness of organized political parties explains in large part the emergence of militarist régimes as the exponents of revolutionary expectations" (p. 163). "The politics of the Middle East are inexplicable without reference to the phenomenon of the mob" (p. 96). "In underdeveloped areas governments ... find themselves impelled to undertake responsibilities which in more developed countries depend upon private initiative." (p. 177-8). "Aversion to mobility is a deep-rooted attribute of peasantry" (p. 203). There are some 22 "states" of differing political colourings where Arabic is the language, and no student of the West should neglect this book for the help it affords in the references to many of them. The Near East is on the march in the 20th century as at other times in history.

Redhill, Surrey, England — Eric F. F. Bishop

The Young Turks. Prelude to the Revolution of 1908. By Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur Jr. Princeton Oriental Studies — Social Science No. 2. Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 148, $ 4.00.

Ernest Ramsaur's little book on "The Young Turks" is an excellent work in style and clarity. To trace the steps whereby the moribund Ottoman Empire of the 19th century metamorphosed itself into the vigorous Turkish Republic of today is of significance not only to the Turkish people and their well-wishers. All students of modern history, and the increasing numbers of those who, with eager hope, are watching the score of States in Asia and Africa now seeking to attain a better national life in the democratic climate of our times, will find valuable lessons both in the weaknesses and the successes of this Turkish story. In passing, it is gratifying that some of the younger men in the Foreign Service of the U.S. are making such studies.

Mr. Ramsaur picks up the story with Sulṭān ᶜAbdul Majīd the reformer (1839-1861) who proved unable to stem the drift toward collapse. His "profligate and sensuous" successor, Sulṭān ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz, bankrupted the impoverished Empire in the following fifteen years. Then after a three-month interim, there began the long reign (1876-1909) of Sulṭān ᶜAbdul Ḥamīd II.

Hopes rose high when in December 1876 the new Sulṭān and Caliph promulgated a Constitution for the Ottoman Empire. But within

two months the great liberal Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha was dismissed, and shortly Parliament was prorogued and Palace Rule began.

In 1889 students in the Military Medical College secretly met to plan the overthrow of the government. Turkish liberals abroad published a paper which found its way into Turkey, and was passed from hand to hand. And the memory of the short-lived Constitution of 1876 nurtured secret talk of "fatherland", "constitution", and "parliament."

A well-advanced conspiracy was discovered in Istanbul in 1895/6, resulting in the arrest and exile of its leaders, some of whom escaped to reinforce the reformers in Paris and Geneva.

Another decade had to pass with mounting frustration and discontent among the officers of the once great Ottoman armies. Radical reform was demanded, the movement being strongest in the Third Army Corps stationed in Thrace and Macedonia, with headquarters in Salonika. Leaders of the "Union and Progress" group were probably working toward action in the fall of 1908. But before the date was set, the long-simmering kettle boiled over by a sort of revolutionary osmosis. Palace spies brought the story to the ever-fearful Sulṭān in his Star Palace above the Bosphorus. The general he sent to put down this "Macedonian revolt" was shot on the street in Monastir on July 7th., as one unit after another of the Third Army joined in the demand for the Constitution. On July 24, 1908, the Sulṭān announced that the Constitution of 1876 — granted and then suppressed by himself thirty-two years before — was now the law of the land. The almost bloodless Young Turk Revolution was over.

Having told the story in accord with his sub-title "Prelude to the Revolution of 1908," Mr. Ramsaur leaves it at that point. But history has no beginning and no ending. The reviewer would gladly have read an Epilogue telling of the Sulṭān's 1909 attempt once again to overthrow the Constitution, of the Third Army's march on Istanbul, of the deposition and exile of ᶜAbdul Ḥamīd. "But that is another story" — as mother used to say after one bed-time story. Let us hope Mr. Ramsaur will some day give us another informative little book.

West Dennis, Cape Cod, Massachusetts. LUTHER R. FOWLE

United States — Persian Diplomatic Relations 1883 — 1921. By Abraham Yeselson, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1956, pp. 252, $ 5.00.

Witness in this book the amazing and bewildering "ramifications of traditional American policies of no-entanglements and non-intervention"!

The primary sources are the National Archives, including "Consular Letters, Teheran, 1883-1906," 2 vols.; "Despatches, Persia," 12 vols., "Instruction, Persia" and "Notes, Persia," 2 vols. These sources were supplemented by valuable material from the "Congressional Record, 1883-1921", and from "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States." "State Department attitudes toward specific occurrences in Persia" provide a suggestive basis for the study of non-

intervention, refuge and asylum, recognition, the protection of naturalized Americans, the Open Door policy, extra-territoriality, and government support for private interests abroad.

The author observes that "the contribution of American missionaries is touched upon only in so far as it involves diplomatic relations," and acknowledges that "the entire range of the activities and influence of missionaries deserves a more complete evaluation." It is probable that the book will have no more interested readers than the missionaries, both those who have lived in Persia through various critical times and those who peruse the book for useful background or perspective as they consider future years of service as fraternal workers in active cooperation with the present Christian Church of Iran.

Oil companies and the State Department might well require those who go out to Iran as their representatives to study this book carefully, to profit by its important and timely presentation of these thirty-eight years of diplomatic relations of the United States with Persia.

The headings of the ten chapters show the scope of the book: The Persian Setting, The First Twenty Years, The Labaree Murder, The Persian Revolution, The Shuster Mission, World War I and the Peace Conference, The Anglo-Persian Agreement and Soviet Tactics, Advisers Again, Oil, and Lessons and Prospects. But the reader is soon aware that in addition to the material the author has culled from national archives on these particular subjects, he has made good use of major works on Persian history, geography and travel, and he has given attention also to valuable articles in periodicals, notably *Independent, Nation,* and *Missionary Review of the World.* As a result it may be said of almost every chapter that while it is brief and factual it is also fascinatingly instructive.

Winter Park, Florida, U.S.A. DWIGHT M. DONALDSON

There goes the Middle East. By Alfred M. Lilienthal. New York, The Devin-Adair Company, 1957. pp. 300/xv $ 4.

Mr. Lilienthal sees Zionism as a threat to two things he cherishes: his faith and his American citizenship. He holds that it puts worship of God below worship of the state of Israel and creates through its call for support of that state by Jews everywhere a dualism of loyalties which might become acute should Middle East tensions spark a crisis in which America's conscience and interests were not on Israel's side. The sympathy for Zionism shown by most Jewish and many Christian Americans he attributes to their misconception of it as a humanitarian movement to save Jewish victims of European persecutions, whereas in his view this is an incidental aspect and the essence of Zionism is Jewish nationalism. In a considered and documented study, *What Price Israel?* (Chicago 1953; reviewed in THE MUSLIM WORLD vol. XLIV, No. 1), he set forth these views and described Zionist activities in the politics and press of the U.S.A.

There goes the Middle East is less impressive. It has been hastily produced (e.g., p. 75, Fazhil Hug for Fazlul Haq; p. 280, Si Bekkar for Si Bekkai); and though there is a good chapter on The Displaced Arabs and further material (some not new) on Zionism in

America, the chapters on Arab international relations (1952-1957) contain undocumented statements and inadequately considered opinions. Mr. Lilienthal glosses over the fact that reckless follies which have been committed in the name of Arab nationalism — and which, as his chapter VI shows, have by no means all been occasioned by the Israel problem — have done as much or more than Zionist propaganda ever could do to antagonise Western public opinion against the Arabs. In 1852-1954, as he relates, a "new look" in U.S.-Arab relations had been introduced by President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles and a "pro-Arab" policy was being followed by Sir A. Eden; by 1956, Mr Dulles was advising Congress to refuse aid for the Aswan Dam and Sir A. Eden was invading Port Said. The author does no service to the Arab cause by giving the reader an incorrect impression that all Arabs except a few kings and politicians are anti-Western. In his disdain for the Baghdad Pact he overlooks the fact that mutual cooperation with the West has been desired by nine tenths of adult Iraqi opinion, and with good reason in view of the efforts which Russia has made to subvert their country and its neighbors Iran and Turkey. He also omits to mention that pro-Western and pro-Iraqi groups emerged from two Syrian elections but were silenced by the Syrian army,

For Arab-Israeli peace, Mr. Lilienthal believes that not only must the frontier and refugee problems be solved but above all that the Israelis must renounce their nationalist ideology of "ingathering the exiles" and must "integrate into the area like the Lebanese Maronites." A realistic observer cannot, however, expect such a change of heart among the present generation of Israelis; and in any case, the Israelis unlike the Maronites do not share the language and culture of the Arabs and are so ahead of the Arabs industrially and technologically that normal trading relations would tend (in the opinion of many Arabs) to make Israel the industrial center of the Fertile Crescent area and to perpetuate that area's present status as a producer of agricultural and mineral raw materials only. In these circumstances Israeli-Arab "integration" could not be expected to bring happiness and an agreed and equitable separation would appear the best solution that statesmanship can hope for.

Institute of Islamic Studies, Montreal. F. R. C. Bagley

The Temple of Jerusalem. By André Parrot, New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., Second Ed. 1955, pp. 111, Table of Contents, Bibliography, List of Illustrations, $ 2.75.

No archaeologist could wish for a more exciting site, nor perhaps a more frustrating one, since so little is possible in the way of actual excavation. Nor could any historian hope for a more fascinating story than that of the Temple of Jerusalem. Nor, surely, could anyone, combining the skills of historian and archaeologist, have achieved a greater feat of authoritative condensation than Professor André Parrot in this latest contribution to the already voluminous literature on the subject.

Here, in a matter of just over one hundred pages, several of which are given over to original or hitherto unpublished line drawings of architectural details or ritual objects, Professor Parrot tells the story

of "this most sacred place" where, as he puts it, "the three monotheistic religions of the world claim a common past in which each, in its different way, sought the one true God."

The book is in five sections dealing with the Temple of Solomon, the Temple of Ezekiel, the second Temple, Herod's Temple and the Ḥaram-al-Sharīf. The inclusion of a chapter on Ezekiel's dream of a Temple that was never actually built is justified on the ground of the influence of "the theological concept it represented on the architecture of the Temple built by Herod more than five hundred years later." The chapter on Herod's Temple itself is one of the most fascinating in the book for the light that it sheds on incident after incident in the Gospel records.

In addition to the line block illustrations the book contains six plates in photogravure, while almost every page carries a number of footnotes with references both to the Bible itself and to the general literature of the subject which, if the reader cares to follow them up, will afford him as complete a guide to the history and significance of the Temple as he is likely to find anywhere.

London, England W. W. Simpson

Abu Bakr. By Dr. Ata Mohy-ud-Din, Ferozsons, 60, The Mall, Lahore. p. 206, Rs. 5/—.

Often Christians are surprised when Muslims say that their religious differences are outweighed by similarities. Dr. Ata Mohy-ud-Din's book on Abū Bakr, while never claiming to prove anything of the sort, reveals graphically how Islam has been subjected to the same triumphs, disasters, reforms and excesses, for the same reasons, and, in its early days, by the same peoples.

The Prophet Muḥammad, though never claiming divinity, suffered physically at the hands of unbelievers as did Abū Bakr, his earliest disciple, who had renounced the life of a prosperous trader and underwent hardships, humiliations and imprisonment in establishing the new religion and welding a nation from disintegrated tribesmen throughout the peninsula. From the moment of his conversion the unity of Arabia became Abū Bakr's obsession. This cherished unity was endangered when the Prophet died leaving resultant disputes that are hardly yet resolved. Abū Bakr in his loyalty was equal to the occasion and built up an empire from a few thousand tribesmen who subdued the peninsula again, opening the way for the subsequent victories in Syria and Iraq. Two years were all too short and his father survived him by some thirty six. Though suggesting that some historians regard his death as a lingering martyrdom, the after effects of poison, the author provides no evidence in support of the theory.

The book is enlivened by anecdotes showing the hero's simplicity of life, his good nature and eloquence. The authenticity of his claim to have been Muḥammad's closest friend is sustained by three hundred utterances to this effect. He embraced Islam "without the slightest hesitation."

The author insists that it is wrong to assume that militant Islam resulted in forcible conversion or ruthless persecution. Though warfare was carried out with utmost vigor, Jewish and Christian survivors

and later the defeated followers of other religions were placed under a sort of Imperial Protection Doctrine, permitted to practise their faith though taxed and not "conscripted." The author quotes Carlyle and others in support of this statement.

Unfortunately, the author's narrative is disjointed, discursive and even confusing. The surfeit of testimonies from Christian historians refuting criticisms of Islam becomes tiresome. So too there is the temptation to incredulity by frequent explanations that Abū Bakr's military exercises were "actuated by motives of self-defence." Certainly Romans, Greeks, Persians, Syrians and others were ideologically and materialistically unsympathetic to the impact of a new, aggressively reformist movement born in the minds of hardy desert warriors determined to gain "at one and the same time heavenly favour and earthly fortune." Yet Abū Bakr died in poverty, bequeathing his inheritance of twenty date trees equally to his daughter and her five dependent relatives, according to the law he had created. His memory is held in veneration by tens of millions throughout the world today.

DAVID MORRIS

La Tunisie Orientale, Sahel et Basse Steppe. By Jean Despois, Presses Universitaires de France (108 Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris (6), second edition, revised, 1955, pp. 554, maps, illustrations, index.

As Tunisia launches on its career as a Republic such a volume as this is appropriate. It is a geographical study of the plains and steppe of Tunisia, exclusive of the northern region, in its historical past and the present, in an effort to discover to what extent the manner of life is conditioned by geographical features and climate and what can be done, if anything, to improve the lot of mankind in Tunisia. Little is known of the prehistoric period, but documentation is abundant for the Phoenician, Roman, Vandal, Byzantine, Arab and Turkish periods. The climate, nature of the soil and rainfall are carefully studied. During two and a half millenia the country and manner of life of its inhabitants have radically changed at least three times. Destructive nomadism was replaced by Phoenician and Roman productivity, whose legacy was utterly ravaged by the 11th century invasion of the Banū Hilal and Sulaym. In recent times arboriculture and the sedentary life have been resumed in the heretofore unproductive areas. It is evident that though the climate has remained practically stable during the past two thousand years, the land has been periodically transformed by man's workmanship. The author believes that it can be made increasingly productive, though economic, technical and political conditions may require a different approach.

Can modern technical skills be adapted advantageously to an arid land like southern Tunisia? In the opinion of the writer the experience of Europeans has shown that only at exhorbitant cost can it be done. Some of the traditional methods can be improved. Olive culture has been most susceptible to development. Over and above agricultural production, however, Europeans have brought peace, security, orderly administration, facility of communication, all of which contribute to the extension of sedentary life.

The present evolution of rural and urban life is described in detail

and in all of its aspects: property rights and administration, economic factors, dwellings, employment, French colonisation, fixation of the nomads on the soil, fisheries, life in the major cities such as Kairawan, Sousse, Monastir, Mahdia, Sfax, the latter surrounded by over five million olive trees.

Geographers sociologists, agriculturalists, anthropologists will find in this volume, by virtue of its minute analysis and generous notes and references, a mine of documentation for a study of the Tunisia of the past and the present.

Hartford Seminary Foundation,
Hartford, Connecticut. E. H. Douglas

Initation à L'Algérie. By 18 writers, Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 11, Rue Saint-Sulpice, Paris 6, 1957, pp. 422, plus xi. Illustrations, maps. 950 francs, paper.

As its name implies, this volume intends to initiate the reader into a knowledge of the pertinent facts relating to Algeria. Though not exhaustive, the information it conveys is extensive, scientifically sound and helpful to an understanding of the problems of Algeria today. Each one of the eighteen contributors is an accomplished scholar in his own field. Some are of Algerian origin; others have had long residence in the land. They are: J. Alazard, S. Bencheneb, P. Boyer, R. Celly, M. Colombe, C. Courtois, E. Dermenghem, L. Golvin, M. Larnaude, R. Le Tourneau, G. Marçais, P. Marçais, G. Mercier, L. Milliot, H. Pérès, A. Picard, H. Weiler, X. Yacono.

The work is divided into three sections:

1. Beginning with a study of the physical features of the Sahara and the littoral, Prof. Larnaude concludes that while with effort and money one may some day improve agricultural production, the climate cannot be changed, the latter presenting obstacles peculiar to Algeria.

2. The second section includes studies of the prehistoric, Punic, Roman, Vandal, Byzantine periods, with considerable consideration given to the rôle of the Berbers throughout, and continues on through the Muslim and Turkish periods up to the time of the French occupation.

3. The third section presents studies of the population, the Berber and Arabic languages, the religious situation and development, social life, Arab culture, literature, arts and crafts, political organization and administration, and the economic factors in the development of the land.

Political considerations growing out of present tensions are intentionally excluded, for the point of view is scientifically objective.

The work admirably fulfills its purpose to present in summary fashion, yet with sufficient factual data, historical material and statistics, Algeria as it has arisen out of the prehistoric past, as it has developed under the influence of various cultures, and as it is today. For those seeking reliable information on Algeria its value is greatly enhanced by an extensive bibliography of ancient and modern works following each chapter.

Hartford Seminary Foundation.
Hartford, Connecticut. E. H. Douglas

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

Independence. The year 1957 marks the independence of three states of special interest to Muslims. On March 6th, Ghana gained her independence and became the ninth member of the British Commonwealth. Of her 4½ million population 120,000 are Muslims. Arab historians, especially Al-Bakrī (d. 1094), relate the conquest of the indigenous pagan population by the Almohads in the 11th century.

On July 25 the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly met in Tunis and abolished the monarchy, deposing the 76-year old Bey Al-Amīn, declared Tunisia to be a Republic and elected the 54-year old nationalist leader Ḥabīb Bourguiba as its first President. The following day the Tunisian Cabinet resigned. On July 29th a new cabinet, including twelve Secretaries of State and three Under Secretaries, was recognized. The Editor of *The Muslim World* had the honour and pleasure of being present at the debate on July 25th, in Bardia Palace, Tunis.

On August 31st the Independence Stadium of Kuala Lumpur, Malaya, was the scene of the enactment of the independence of the Federation of Malaya within the British Commonwealth. On that day the rulers of the nine Malay states assembled and elected Sir ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān, chief of the State of Negri Sembilan, as Paramount Ruler of the Federation for a term of five years. The Paramount Ruler, sixty-one years old, is not related to the Prime Minister Prince ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān. Out of a population of some six million, approximately three million are Muslims. Among the problems facing the new government will be social and economic adjustments within the framework of a democratic form of government, eradication of Communist terrorism in the jungle which has been going on since 1948, and the maintenance of harmonious relationships between the Malays and the 2,300,000 Chinese within the Federation for the sake of the welfare of the nation.

The Pilgrimage, A. H. 1376. Over one million Muslims participated in the 1376/1957 pilgrimage to Mecca. It is estimated that over 800,000 came from Saudi Arabia while 215,575 came from other lands.

Number of pilgrims and their origin:

Egypt	32,109	Ceylon	115
Syria	5,589	Mauritius	22
Pakistan	23,670	Aden	109
Indian Muslims	13,166	Ethiopia	439
Indonesia	13,157	Capetown	70
Malay	4,273	Northeast Africa	259
Siam	1,686	Turkey	3,199
Afghanistan	2,494	Bukhara	128
Jordan	3,907	China	95
Iraq	2,854	Iran	10,398
Palestine	4,783	Greece	3
Lebanon	1,782	America	9
Hadhramaut	6,407	Yugoslavia	27
Morocco	2,163	The Arab Gulf	6,548

Tunisia	964	Cyprus	22
Libya	1,022	Japan	1
Algeria	167	Nigeria	258
Senegal	841	Zanzibar	274
Sudan	6,874	Italy	1
Somaliland	132	Total from outside	
Yemen	43,773	Saudi Arabia	215,575
West Africa	21,622	Saudi Arabia, estimated	800,000
Burma	163	Total for season	1,015,575

Education on the March. *Turkey.* On July 23rd ground was broken at Erzurum for the foundations of Ataturk University, the new center of learning in Eastern Anatolia.

Morocco. The French Protectorate left in Morocco 1,677 schools for Muslim children with an enrolment of 316,000. Yet there are approximately 1½ million Moroccan children of school age. To meet the crisis and the challenge, the Moroccan Administration has added to the two Normal Schools in Casablanca and Rabat seven more regional schools for the training of teachers. This accelerated program will make available this year some three thousand new teachers. Even this number, though a tremendous help, is insufficient. The Administration has therefore turned to France to solicit the assistance of one thousand more teachers.

Tunisia. In the new Republic of Tunisia the problem is also to find teachers. During the year 1956-57 some two thousand French professors and teachers served the schools of Tunisia. But under the new status of Tunisian independence around 800 have decided to leave the country, causing thereby a serious loss. This comes at a time when the Tunisian people have shown a genuine desire to go forward in cultural development.

To meet the need for trained leadership in this transitional period the Tunisian Government has created:

1. A Normal School for Higher Studies, for the training of professors, open to candidates of both sexes, comprising Arabic language and literature, history, geography, mathematics.
2. A Center for Economic Studies.
3. A Tunisian Institute of Journalism, for the study of press procedures and journalism in general, in both the French and Arabic languages.

Saudi Arabia. The Ministry of Education has plans for increasing educational facilities throughout the Kingdom. The 1957 budget for educational purposes reaches the figure of 73 million Riyals, 61 million more than in 1951. The increase is for the construction of new schools and the training of teachers, including the field of technology and business training to meet the needs of the new day. It includes a program of study abroad for some 600 Saudi Arabian students in the Near East, Europe and America. It will comprise education in conformity with the rich cultural Arab heritage as well as modern elements where necessity requires such. Schools for girls are appearing. In Southwest Arabia it is reported that out of 75,000 pupils

in school 15,000 are girls. The Ministry is looking forward to the creation of a Saudi Arabian University with the various colleges of Arts, Sciences, Medicine, Literature and languages.

Schools for nomads The *Foreign education digest* for July-September 1957 (1650 Oxford Street, Berkeley 9, California) relates how in some lands educational facilities are extended to nomads who are constantly on the move. In Jordan an effort is being made to settle the nomads on the land. But the administration is also sponsoring boarding schools for those whose parents cannot settle, and native Bedouins are being trained for teaching.

In Iran, where tribal units travel together, schools travel with the tribes. Tribesmen are teachers. Tents and materials are provided by the administration.

Also in the Hoggar (central Sahara, French) children of Tuareg tribesmen are taught by teachers whose tents and meagre camp equipment are transported by camel. A government-subsidized canteen provides meals for the pupils.

By such means the people who have heretofore been deprived, through no fault of their own, of the blessings of enlightenment are gradually becoming the recipients of modern education. Methods may be primitive, means inadequate and the numbers permitted to enjoy these privileges few. But the desire to learn is present. Progress in the right direction is being made. The people are intellectually as well as physically on the move.

Nigeria. The Western Region Government of Nigeria is to spend a total sum of over £ 22 million within the five years ending in 1960, to complete its program of free, universal primary education. The total grants-in-aid paid by the Government under this scheme in 1956 were over £ 4 and a quarter million while in 1957 nearly £ 5 million was expended. Universal primary education was introduced in January, 1955 and since then the Government has spent an average of fifty per cent of its annual budget on education.

Islam in the United States. "The Light", Aḥmadiyyah weekly of Lahore, on May 24, 1957 published a statement by Mr. Muḥammad ᶜAbdullāh, formerly in charge of the San Francisco Islam Mission, on Muslim missionary activity in the United States. Textually the article reads:

> "In the hot desert of Arizona, where sandy hills were a great hindrance to transportation, experiments for breeding camels were made. The camels were introduced from Arabia and with them came Hadji Ali. The camels failed, but Hadji Ali was left in Arizona. He proved himself the first missionary of Islam. He built a mosque in Arizona and preached Islam. There are now quite a few Muslims in Arizona. Muslims from Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are settled in Sacramento Valley. They have recently built a mosque at the cost of $ 80,000 (eighty thousand dollars).....
>
> "Two Muslim organizations in Pakistan have established their Missions in Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco. I was in charge of the San Francisco Mission for seventeen months.

My other associates were Messrs. H. Akbar and A. R. Sahu Khan. The Mission in San Francisco has a three-storey building and adjacent to it is a vacant block of land for the proposed mosque. As soon as funds are available from Pakistan headquarters, the foundation of the mosque will be laid.

"In Detroit a very devoted Muslim, Muharrem Nadji, is propagating Islam by means of free distribution of literature. He works at a steel factory and he has been presenting Islam to the Americans for more than thirty years. The first American Muslim Missionary was the late Mr. Russel Webb, who accepted Islam in 1890 when he was United States Consul in the Philippines. He resigned from his service and returned to the States to publish a monthly journal entitled the "Moslem World." He wrote many books on Islam.

"Among the Negroes, Eliaj Muhammad, a Negro Muslim, has established 19 Missions in the United States. His headquarters are in Chicago. His temples are known as "Muhammad's Temples of Islam." The followers of Eliaj Muhammad are very zealous workers. The women don't take part in social dances, and they wear head coverings. They are fanatics in many ways.

"In spite of the fact that there are people of different denominations and sects, religious controversies are nonexistent. All work together for promoting peace and harmony. Many Inter-faith Councils and religious conferences are held each year to receive first-hand information about different religions. Everyone is free to possess, worship, preach and practise any religion in the United States."

(Note: For further references to Islam in the U.S. see this Quarterly, Jan. 1935, pp. 40-44; Jan. 1942, pp. 55-59; Jan 1947, pp. 56-61).

Gaza, not Eyeless. The following incident has been recorded about a wounded Egyptian soldier, who had lost so much blood that a transfusion was necessary. To an appeal for blood by Dr. James M. Young, Jr., there were only two responses, his own and that of a blind woman evangelist. When the wounded man was told that someone had volunteered to give blood for him, he said it must be a mistake, since the persons who thought enough of him to offer help could not reach him. When he was assured that the blood was meant for him, he asked to see the person who was so concerned about his well being. When the blind woman was taken to his bedside, the Egyptian could not restrain his tears. In such compassion and its recognition are the tokens of the Kingdom of Heaven even in the Gaza Strip.

Unified Arabic Alphabet. We are indebted to Professor J. Maurice Hohlfeld of Hareford Seminary Foundation, Linguistics Department, for the paragraphs that follow. Whenever anyone approaches the subject of alphabets he usually finds himself in the realm of the "versus." Immediately there will be voices raised concerning the old versus the new, the Arabic script versus the Roman script, the colloquial versus the classical, the Kufic versus the Naskhi, the Naskhi versus the Nastaliq or Ruqʿah and so forth. Many logical and, too often, many illogical, unscientific and impressionistic arguments will be offered

dealing with the merits or demerits of one system of calligraphy versus another.

"Unified" Arabic will also be open to such argumentation. In this instance, it will be a matter of printing versus handwriting or a new type design versus the conventional type or a new system of printing versus other improved systems of duplicating. Mention should be made of an improved system of printing that uses an excellent set of legible characters known as Ghusub and manufactured at St. Etienne, France. One of the main features of the system is to shorten the space required by letters that extend below the line. The limit would be that distance required for the printing of such symbols as those representing, rā, zā and wāw. Final letters with their embellishments such as khā, ghain and others are cut off at the "rā" level. About 70 items make up the font.

One solution to the problem of the choice of an alphabet whether written or printed, phonetic or phonemic is to consider its function. What are the objectives of the new system that is being introduced?

The Unified Arabic Alphabet Foundation with Mr. Naṣrī Khaṭṭār as its president states that one of the primary aims of the Unified Type is to "simplify the learning of the traditional Arabic script." The new literate, whether he be a child or an adult beginner, will not need to learn the four variants for certain letters as they occur initially, medially or finally or in isolation. Only one basic form is used to represent the sound or sounds ascribed to it. The form for the initial ᶜayn is the same shape in medial and final positions. There is no descending swirl at the end of the letter. This may seem awkward to those who have spent many years of toil endeavoring to master all of the complicated shapes of the orthography. Further, the new learner will not encounter hundreds of connectors technically known as ligatures. These ligatures are combinations of two or more letters which are joined by ascenders, descenders and oftentimes other embellishments in handwriting. Since printing uses disconnected characters, the numerous ligatures are not needed.

The task of learning the traditional Arabic script, as advocated by Mr. Khaṭṭār, is simplified for the beginner in that he will be exposed to only 30 basic letters in contrast to the 400 printing characters now in use. Less than three dozen forms can be applied to the keyboards of typewriters and linotype machines as well as to various sizes of type for the printer's font.

For demonstration purposes the U.A.A. Foundation has produced a primer entitled "Shoof Baba Shoof" (Look, Daddy Look). It is a short, illustrated reader for children of pre-school age and for the new literates. In format and in primer construction it follows the principles outlined by Paul McKee in "The Teaching of Reading in the Elementary School" (Houghton, Mifflin and Company, N.Y. 1948). The book contains beautifully colored pictures of Near Eastern people and background. Both the printed type and the handwritten script are used on each page, the former appearing above the latter. The reason for this device is to use the printed form as a stepping-stone to the traditional, ornate style of handwriting.

A second advantage of the Khaṭṭār System is an economical one.

Such type would make for a cheaper and more efficient means of printing. This in turn would probably mean a wider distribution of Arabic literature. Up to the present time Arabic books are printed in 24-point type. Smaller sizes have been used in the past but one finds that those of 14-point or less using traditional characters are barely legible. However, Unified Type has been produced in 6 point and is quite legible. A great saving in paper can also be had since a book that contains 300 pages when printed by conventional means will only require 100 pages in Unified Type. In addition, the smaller type will be more legible than the traditional type.

Whether or not the new system of printing will be acceptable to those who speak the language natively is a matter of conjecture at this time. No doubt the area of debate will center about the connected versus the disconnected letters of the alphabet. In English, two separate alphabets exist side by side. In fact, the young American or British child learns the printed alphabet first because this is the one most frequently used on the building blocks he plays with as an educational toy. Only when he enters the period of formal schooling does he really receive instruction and drill in the art of cursive handwriting. The Unified Type seems to bear a much closer resemblance to Arabic handwriting than English printing does to its counterpart.

If one considers the high degree of illiteracy in many Arabic-speaking countries and the low level of mass education in the same areas, he will want to experiment with a new type of scaffolding to assist in the erection of the building of learning and knowledge. After the learner has achieved an acceptable level of communication he will be able to discard the scaffolding in favor of the standard, conventional alphabet.

Miscellanea. Copies have reached London of a new journal in Israel, *The New Outlook,* which gives interesting evidence of a courageous, if minority,sentiment in Israel vis-à-vis the Arab world and the problem of Israeli involvement in it. It may be presumed that the opinions to which the new journal gives voice have always underlay at least some Israeli thinking. What is new about them is the clarity and boldness of their articulation. *The New Outlook* deplores the characteristic Israeli tendency to ignore the misery of the refugeedom Israel's existence has occasioned, on the plea that there are enough problems internal to Israel and that the Israeli contribution to those of the Arabs lies simply in the force of creative example. It also argues that Israeli survival ultimately pre-supposes Arab goodwill and that securing this should be the paramount aim of Israeli policy. It also points out that Israel cannot exonerate herself completely from the Arab tragedy or from the pattern of Arab relations. It invites the attention of Israel to a patient recognition of what is valid in the Arab case, in preference to the view that insists that since there is irreconciliability there is, in fact, no case at all. Whatever may be the extent of the diffusion of these views there can be no mistaking either the courage or the farsightedness they demonstrate. To see as we are seen is all too rare a faculty in the affairs of nations.

The Emir of Zaria in Northern Nigeria, Muᶜallim Jaᶜafaru, has

opened in his palace a class for adult education for women, which has about twenty-four on its roll. Inaugurating the session, the Emir spoke of the importance of female literacy in the life and progress of the community, The instructor is Ḥalīma Giwa, organiser of Adult education for women in Northern Nigeria.

The results of the Turkish elections of October last have been greeted in many circles by two salient comments. The one concerns the unanimity and discipline of the electorate in what related to foreign affairs, at a time of sharp, if artificial, provocation. The second is satisfaction at a stronger opposition in the nation's parliament.

There has been a healthy increase in the voting strength of the Republican Party, together with clear victories in important segments of the population, like the capital city of Ankara and Adana in the south. This situation may enable a much more real and equal exercise of democratic processes which, prior to the election, were being increasingly jeopardised in governmental tendencies to autocracy.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

By Sue Molleson Foster

I. GENERAL

The American University of Beirut. Reuben W. Smith. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. October, 1956. pp. 329-334. Describes present-day organization, curriculum and financial difficulties.

A Bibliography of Southern Kurdish. D. N. Mackenzie. *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1957. pp. 31-37. A classified list of publications from 1945 to 1955, with comment.

The decorative use of Arabic lettering in the West. R. A. Jairazbhoy. *Islamic Literature,* Lahore. November, 1956. pp. 23-29. Illustrated by 13 plates, the article shows how Kufic Arabic script reached Europe in the Middle Ages and how it was used.

Developments of the Quarter: Comment and Chronology. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington. Spring, 1957. pp. 163-190. Covers January 1 — March 31, 1957 and comments on the case of the Arab refugees in Jordan and Gaza, on Cyprus and on North Africa.

Dialectes arabes et francisation linguistique d'Algérie. Mohammed Hadj-Sadok. *Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales,* Algiers. 1955. pp. 61-97. A study of over 1500 French words, now common in colloquial Algerian speech, with comments on the psychological influence of French language and culture on the Arabs.

Documents. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington. Spring, 1957. pp. 191-197. The text of the General Assembly's resolution on the recent hostilities in Egypt.

The drillings and diggings of Dr. Phillips. Herbert Solow. *Fortune,* New York. February, 1957. pp. 146-149 plus. Tells of the achievements of Dr. Wendell Phillips in several Arab countries.

Edward Pococke, 1604-1691. P. M. Holt. *History Today,* London. January, 1957. pp. 54-61. Dr. Pococke, the first Laudian professor of Arabic at Oxford, contributed much to Oriental studies and helped draw England closer to the Muslim world.

Expedition to the Elburz Mountains. W. J. E. Norton. *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1957. pp. 50-53. A lively account of conditions met and surmounted by the 1956 Cambridge University North Persia Expedition in its ascent of various mountain peaks and in its investigations of the life of the area.

The fifth season of exploration in the Negeb. Nelson Glueck. *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research,* Baltimore. February, 1957. pp. 11-25.

Parmi les publications récentes de langue arabe. A. Van Leeuwen. *I.B.L.A.,* Tunis. 1956, part 1. pp. 72-80. Discusses various magazines and the new series of books called the Kitāb al-Baʿth.

Shamshir Ghar. Louis Duprée. *Archaeology,* Cincinnati. June, 1957. pp. 108-116. Describes finds in Afghanistan dating from the 3rd to the 11th century A.D. — many of them Islamic.

Sur le dialecte turc d'Azerbâydjân iranien. V. Monteil. *Journal Asiatique,* Paris. 1956, part 1. pp. 1-78. An exhaustive study with texts, vocabulary, bibliography, and pronunciation guide.

II. ARABIA

L'Arabie méridionale sous controle britannique. Jean-Jacques Berreby. *L'Afrique et l'Asie,* Paris. 1956, part 2. pp. 8-16. Describes skilful handling of an oil-rich section which Britain hopes to keep under indirect control with native administrators.

Derivation and orthography al-Rubʿal-Khālī. Nabih Amin Faris. *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1957. pp. 28-30. The author finds that the name was unknown until the middle part of the 19th century and that it stems from the usage by Doughty on the authority of a tale told him by a native friend named Zeyd.

III. QURʾĀN. TRADITION. THEOLOGY

L'autobiographie d'Ibn Khaldūn. Ali Merad. *I.B.L.A.,* Tunis. 1956, part 1. pp. 53-64. The author believes the "Ta'rif" is the biographical source for Ibn Khaldūn's complex personality.

Les aventures d'un prisonnier arabe et d'un patrice byzantin à l'époque des guerres bulgaro-byzantines. *Dumbarton Oaks Papers,* Cambridge. 1956. pp. 49-72. Translation and analysis of a 10th century story from al-Tanūkhis al-Faraj ba's al-shiddah.

Intorno alle origini della teoria del panarabismo. Sylvia G. Haim. *Oriente Moderno,* Roma. July, 1956. pp. 409-421. Analyzes the influence of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī on modern Arab political thought.

Un texte persan sur la "Légende de Gayōmart". Gilbert Lazard. *Journal Asiatique,* Paris. 1956, part 2. pp. 201 seq. A study of four manuscripts in the Bibliothèque Nationale.

IV. HISTORY OF ISLAM

Islam and Arab nationalism. Joel Carmichael. *Commentary,* New York. July, 1957. pp. 20-27. The author believes that Islam does not form a basis for Arab unity, although Arab nationalism will draw

on it to a certain extent until the Near East learns to cope with its social, economic and spiritual needs.

THE JAMAᶜAT-I-ISLAMI OF PAKISTAN. Freeland Abbott. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington. Winter, 1957. pp. 37-51. Describes the work and influence of a religious party in Pakistan headed by Maulana ᶜAbu-l ᶜAlā Maudūdī and similar to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Servants of God in Iran.

L'OCCIDENT FACE AUX PAYS D'ISLAM. Tibor Mende. *Esprit,* Paris. January, 1957. pp. 54-69. A survey of the astounding progress of Muslim lands toward freedom from white domination since the British withdrawal from India.

ORIGINI E SVILLUPPIDI DE MOVIMENTO NAZIONALISTA ALGERINO. Romain Rainero. *Oriente Moderno,* Roma. July, 1956. pp. 353-365. Tells of developments since the start of World War II.

V. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

L'ACTION DU NOUVEAU RÉGIME ÉGYPTIEN DANS LES DOMAINES ÉCONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL. Jean G. Economidès. *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* Le Cairo. Octobre, 1956. pp. 5-44. A detailed survey of the achievements of the Nāsir government.

COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN ARAB STATES. Keith Williams. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington. Spring, 1956. pp. 123-138. A comprehensive article with tables of routes, ownership, flight frequency, etc.

LES EUROPÉENS EN TUNISIE AU MILIEU DU XIXe SIÈCLE. Jean Ganiage. *Cahiers de Tunisie,* Tunis. 1956. pp. 388-421. Drawing on archives for his material, the author traces the beginnings and final debâcle of a group living in Tunis from 1840-1870.

JOURNEY THROUGH TURKEY. M. Philips Price. *The Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. April, 1957. pp. 94-101. "Turkey remains the most stable and politically and socially sound part of the Middle East" devoted to the U.N. and the Baghdad Pact and affording the traveller a high dergee of stimulating contacts.

MATERIALS FOR A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Harold Zink, ed. *American Political Science Review,* Washington. December 1956. pp. 1120-1123. Deals mainly with Turkey, Iran, Egypt and the Sudan.

NOTES ON THE RIFIAN COMMUNITY OF TANGIER. David H. Hart. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington. Spring, 1957 pp. 153-162. Describes the Berber descent, the make-up and the customs of about 70,000 of Tangier's 100,000 Muslims.

SLAVERY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. E.C.W.W. Greenridge. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. December, 1956. pp. 435-440. Presents official and unofficial evidence of the existence of slavery in the Middle East, especially in Arabia.

A STUDY OF LAND REFORM IN EGYPT. Dr. Ḥasan Abū al-Suᶜūd. *The Islamic Review,* Woking. April, 1957. pp. 14-19. Examines the Law of 1952 and shows its encouraging features for the poor peasant.

VI. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

LES MALADIES INFANTILE DE L'INDFPENDANCE. *Esprit,* Paris, Juin, 1957. pp. 888-980. Contributions by various authors on the problems facing the new states, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Tunis and Morocco.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY (U.S.): AN EGYPTIAN POINT OF VIEW. Hussain Mones. *Current History,* New York. December, 1956. pp. 357-369. The author, the Egyptian General Director of Culture, voices distrust of the close relations between the United States and Europe.

LA POLITIQUE MUSULMANE DES SOVIETS DANS UNE RÉPUBLIQUE PLURINATIONALE : LE DAGHESTĀN. H. C. D'Encausse. *L'Afrique et l'Asie,* Paris. 1956. pp. 17-38. The Russians strive to win over their Muslim populations but still have not subdued the strong nationalism of Islam.

THE REAL POLICE FORCE. *The Round Table,* London. March, 1957. pp. 103-107. Criticism of the United Nations for its alleged lack of action in the Hungarian crisis, in the Suez Canal dispute, and in the Kashmir impasse.

REBUFFS FROM EGYPT. *The Round Table,* London. March, 1957. pp. 172-175. Despite Pakistan's offers of help to Egypt in her time of trouble with Great Britain, France, and Israel, Egypt still resents Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad Pact and prefers to align herself with India.

THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS. *The Round Table,* London. March, 1957. pp. 165-168. Gives Australia's position of disapproval of British and French action against Egypt.

WASHINGTON AND THE WORLD. Charles J. V. Murphy. *Fortune,* New York. January, 1957. pp. 78-83 plus. Discusses the United States' handling of the Egyptian crisis of 1956.

THE WEAKNESS OF THE WEST. *King-Hall News-Letter,* London. July 24, 1957. pp. 849-853. A vigorous attack on the laissez-faire attitude of England and America in the face of the Russian menace and in dealing with the restless Middle East. The article also presents equally vigorous solutions.

VII. NORTH AFRICA

ALGERIA IN REVOLT. Herbert Luethy. *The Atlantic Monthly,* Boston. November, 1956. pp. 73-77. The author believes that Algeria — unlike Tunisia and Morocco which always were organized states — is so thoroughly colonialized that a French withdrawal would plunge it into total anarchy.

ALGÉRIE. Jean-Marie Domenach. *Esprit,* Paris. Mai, 1957. pp. 777-789. If France does not cease clutching at the conservative past and begin looking at inescapable facts boldly and with vision, she will prove herself a dishonoured and unworthy Power.

ALGÉRIE ET RENAISSANCE FRANÇAISE. J. M. Domenach and G. Suffert. *Esprit,* Paris. Juin, 1957. pp. 937-948. A plea for imagination and generosity enough to realize and accept the fact that the era of colonization is over and that of independent states has arrived.

LYAUTEY. Victor Cohen. *Quarterly Review,* London. April, 1957. pp. 180-193. "Driven on by his own creative fires he built an abiding memorial to France's civilizing mission. Judged by any standards he remains unique. He was a conqueror who was also a statesman; he possessed the rare ability to combat as well as govern. And no despot wielding absolute power such as he possessed ever abused it less... He nursed his Protectorate from tribalism to nationhood. Morocco remains his legacy to the comity of modern nations."

OÙ EN EST LE MAROC? *L'Afrique et l'Asie,* Paris. 1956, part 3. pp. 24-35. Suggests how France may be able to help Marocco.

THE SPANISH SAHARA. Marvin W. Mikesell. *Geographical Review,* New York. January, 1957. pp. 131-134. Deals with economic and geographical research in the Rio de Oro.

QUELQUES RÉFLECTIONS SUR L'ACCÈS DES FRANÇAIS MUSULMANS À LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE EN ALGÉRIE. *L'Afrique et l'Asie,* Paris. 1956, part 3. pp. 57-61. Analyzes complaints against the Law of March 17, 1956 and the Decree of March 26, 1956 designed to provide opportunities for greater employment.

VIII. THE NEAR EAST

L'ADMINISTRATION URBAINE EN SYRIE MÉDIÉVALE. E. Ashtor-Strauss. *Reviste degli Studii Orientali,* Roma. 1956, part 1-3. pp. 73-128. Tells of the origins of municipal institutions and of the revolt of Ibn al-Sūfī against the feudal lords.

CONDITIONS D'UNE CULTURE JUIVE EN ISRAËL. D. Donath. *Études,* Paris. Juin, 1957. pp. 414-420. The descendants of the present-day Israeli, so diverse in background and education, will be the founders of future culture in Israel.

LE DESTIN DE L'IRAQ. Pierre Rondot. *Études,* Paris. Avril, 1957. pp. 98-108. The author praises the good sense and energy of Nuri Pasha Saʿīd but wonders whether Iraq can withstand the combined pressure of ʿAbd. al Nāṣīr and Russia thus remaining faithful to Great Britain.

THE IMPACT OF THE WEST ON PERSIA. A. K. S. Lambton. *International Affairs,* London. January, 1957. pp. 12-25. Mainly discusses Government methods in Persia and the rise of nationalism.

THE IMPACT OF URBANIZATION IN ISRAEL. Bernard D. Weinryb. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington. Winter, 1957. pp. 23-36. The tremendous growth of the coastal cities, making a metropolitan area from Haifa to Tel-Aviv-Jaffa and containing three-fourths of the entire population, frustrates the Government's plan for population diffusion.

IRAN: A T.V.A. FOR THE KHUZESTAN REGION. Gordon M. Clapp. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington. Winter, 1957. pp. 1-11. Describes the findings and plans of the Development and Resources Corporation headed by Dr. Clapp and David E. Lilienthal in conjunction with the Plan Organization of Iran whose managing director is Mr. Abol Hassan Ebtehaj.

THE JORDAN COUP D'ETAT. *History Today,* London. January, 1957. pp. 3-10. A useful, intimate account of the ouster of Glubb Pasha.

THE KURDS OF IRAQ. C. J. Edmonds. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington. Winter, 1957. pp. 52-62. Under the wise rule of Nuri al-Sa'īd, the Prime Minister, the 900,000 Kurds are enjoying an unwonted degree of understanding, cultural independence and official recognition.

MIDDLE EAST FORCE. *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* Annapolis. October, 1956 pp. 1094-1103. Photographs of the Persian Gulf-Red Sea area .

A MIDDLE EAST PERSPECTIVE. Max W. Thornburg. *Fortune,* New York. January, 1957. pp. 97-99 plus. Presents a political-economic policy for the area and advocates supporting native leaders whose aims are in harmony with our allies and ours.

THE PERSIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN. J. B. Kelly. *International Affairs,* London. January, 1957. pp. 51-70. In a survey of the modern history of the island Iran's claim is refuted.

THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Majid Khadduri. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington. Winter, 1957. pp. 12-22. Although hitherto military pacts and alliances between Europe and the Near Eastern countries have been of little actual value, indications are that strong U.S. and European resistance to Russian attack in the area would be inevitable.

SYRIA ON THE MOVE. *World Today,* London. January, 1957. pp. 17-26. The Syrian Communist Party is the largest in the Arab world and is actively influencing the affairs of Syria.

VIII. MISSIONS TO MUSLIMS

Arabia Calling. Winter-Spring, 1956-1957. Whole issue. The Annual Report Number stresses increasing hospital work, the "upgrading" of the educational programme, and efforts at integration and co-operation with other missions in the Near East.

ARABS, JEWS AND WESTERN CHRISTIANS. W. Montgomery Watt. *The East and West Review,* London. July, 1957. pp. 71-76. Urges a greater measure of agreement among Christians in their Near Eastern opinions so that that they can work more unitedly for Arab-Israeli accord.

CHRIST AND MOHAMMED. D. Reeves. *World Dominion,* London. April, 1957. pp. 82-85 Describes Christian staff divergence in a Near Eastern Christian College in which the Government demands that Muslim students be taught Islam.

Église Vivante, Paris. Mai-Aout, 1957. The whole issue is called *Le Monde Missionnaire en 1956* and gives much new material on the Near East, North Africa, Pakistan, etc.

EVANGELISM IN WEST PAKISTAN. R. W. F. Wootton. *The East and West Review,* London. July, 1957. pp. 82-87. Praises the amazing opportunity for free speech even in the open air at fairs or bazaars and describes the various phases of evangelistic work.